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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa’s land redistribution policy (1994-2008) has been widely publicised, and 
has come under scrutiny of late from the public, private and government spheres, 
highlighting a need for research in this area. The research examines progress in South 
Africa’s land redistribution programme in two of KwaZulu-Natal’s district 
municipalities, Uthungulu and iLembe. Specifically the research investigates whether 
the government has paid above market prices when purchasing sugarcane farmland 
for redistribution in these districts. Moreover, it is illustrated how productivity on 
redistributed farms has been affected with the changes in ownership.  
 
To investigate the research questions, reviews of theories pertaining to property 
rights, land reform and market structures were conducted. Moreover, two cases 
studies were conducted in the districts of Uthungulu and iLembe, with assistance from 
the Department of Land Affairs, Inkezo Land Company and the South African Cane 
Growers Association.  
 
The case study data indicate that above ordinary market prices have been paid (2004-
2006) by the government for sugarcane farmland in the districts concerned, and 
further that productivity has been negatively impacted ‘during’ and ‘post‘ transfer, in 
the majority of cases.     
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CHAPTER ONE 
            
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its conception in 1994, the land reform policy in South Africa has been a topical 
issue, provoking numerous academic and public debates (Didiza, 2005; Bernstein, 
2008:1). Recently the progress of the reform process has come under increasing 
political scrutiny from various sectors, particularly those driving its implementation. 
The need for additional research, which needs to shed more light on the policy, is 
therefore evident. The current study investigates the prices at which land was 
transferred in the years 2002 to 2006. Further, it investigates the levels of productivity 
on the farms which formed part of the selected sample.  
 
1.1 Context of the research 
 
Market power is an important determinant of price, and is predominantly attributed to 
the structure of the market (e.g. Perfect competition, Monopoly, Oligopoly, 
Monopsony, Oligopsony). Factors such as the size of buyers and sellers, and barriers 
to entry and exit affect a market’s structure, and can create an environment where one 
or a few buyers or sellers dominate, allowing them to have a major impact on the 
price of goods (Sutton, 2006:1-17). The result is a market of imperfect competition, 
which will not be efficient (Black et. al., 1999:35). For efficiency to be maintained a 
competitive market is required, where no single participant has a major impact on the 
price of a good. Although market structure is an important theoretical contributor to 
market power, in reality, however, property rights and legislation play an equally vital 
role in the price determination process.  
 
At the summit on land reform in 2005, South Africa’s then deputy president Mlambo-
Ngcuka (2005) held that the ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ framework was slowing 
down land reform. She stated that the principle must be reconsidered, as the state was 
the only buyer of land for redistribution, allowing farmers to obtain excessive prices 
for their land. The Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Didiza (2005), 
 
 
mentioned that within such a new mechanism, the state should have the power to 
influence the markets, and that a land tax should be implemented as soon as possible.  
 
The land reform policy comprises two main categories, namely specific historical 
Restitution of land rights and Redistribution of land. Restitution involves restoring 
rights of ownership on land dispossessed after 1913 (van der Walt and Pienaar, 
2006:322). Redistribution is a less restrictive category in terms of who can obtain 
land, focusing on meeting “the general need for land amongst the poor in both rural 
and urban areas”. The process is not based on historical land claims, but aimed to 
redress the racial imbalance in land ownership (van der Walt and Pienaar, 2006:322). 
All ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ land redistribution transactions are expected to have 
taken place at market related prices (Didiza, 2005).     
 
In general, the process of land redistribution seeks to address the racial injustices of 
the past. Racial discrimination led to inequalities being experienced by a majority of 
the population. It can be argued that one of the main symbolic and legislative causes 
of land injustices was the Native Land Act 27 of 1913 (NLA, 1913), which was 
enacted by the state to alleviate poverty amongst white individuals at the expense of 
the black population. By 1994, eighty-seven percent of South African land was owned 
by a white minority, who constituted less than twenty percent of the total population 
(Ramutsindela, 1997:102). Hence, the newly elected government, in 1994, sought to 
reverse the status quo. To achieve this, the authorities set a target of redistributing 
thirty percent of commercial farmland to the previously disadvantaged by 2014 (DLA, 
2007b:1).  
 
Under the democratic government, a regime of statutes has been formulated to 
promote “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms” (Constitution, 1996:6). For example, the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994 (RLRA, 1994:1), was promulgated to control the process by 
which specific persons could claim the return of their land, if it had been taken from 
them post 1913. The act was followed by a series of similar legislative revisions:  
 
a) The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (LRA, 1996:1)  
 
 
b) The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (IPILRA, 1996:1) 
c) The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA, 1997:1), and  
d) The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 
of 1998 (PIEA, 1998:1). 
 
These Acts regarded the consolidation of security of tenure as an important step to 
improve the quality and security of existing land rights. Finally, the Communal Land 
Rights Act 11 of 2004 (CLRA, 2004:1) was enacted, providing a procedure to ensure 
that stable communal land rights were achievable for the efficient governance of 
community owned land. The legal framework for land reform has thus been put in 
place, but as mentioned, the process has faced many challenges. The government 
contends that market reliance on the current framework, which cites the state as the 
sole buyer has resulted in practical distortions, such as an inability to meet the reform 
targets.    
 
The principle of one buyer (i.e. government), has led it seems to a situation where 
‘unwilling sellers’ are being offered higher than market prices for their land in an 
attempt to lure them into becoming ‘willing sellers’. The result may be a breakdown 
in the land redistribution property market, if it is found that a market operating 
through supply and demand constraints has led to high profits for sellers and 
expensive public spending by government for farms that may be inefficient in terms 
of their productivity. Developing the notion held by government that the ‘willing 
buyer/willing seller’ principle forms the basis for land redistribution, two questions 
remain:  
 
1) Whether the current redistribution prices are publicly justifiable, and/or 
2) How to improve productivity to justify those prices 
 
1.2 Goals of the research 
 
a) To investigate the prices paid in the redistribution market versus the ordinary land 
market with reference to studies undertaken in Northern KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
 
 
b) To explore and analyse the changes in the levels of productivity ‘before’, ‘during’ 
and ‘post’ transfer of ownership.     
 
c) To make recommendations for land redistribution policy.    
 
1.3 Research methods overview 
 
The methods used to answer the research questions are thoroughly discussed in 
chapter three. Briefly, two case studies were conducted in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, 
focusing on the main areas where land redistribution is taking place. This 
incorporated only sales of sugarcane farmland, comprising the dominant land usage.  
 
The prices paid per hectare of yield for sales of sugarcane farmland through ‘the 
willing buyer/willing seller’ method were compared with the average non-
redistributive market price per hectare of yield in the surrounding areas. To that end a 
number of matrices were constructed, which grouped sales transactions according to 
district municipality. This permitted an analysis of whether above market prices were 
paid for sugarcane farmland through land redistribution.  
 
Productivity was assessed by comparing the farms output per hectare ‘before’, 
‘during’ and ‘post’ transfer, and how it strayed from optimal levels. Production data 
was also grouped by district municipality and compiled in comprehensive tables.    
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter two provides a review of the relevant theory. The methods surrounding the 
paper are detailed in chapter three, whilst chapter four comprises a case study, which 
sets out to address the aforementioned goals of the research. Discussion and 
recommendations follow in chapter five, and chapter six concludes the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
            
 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The definition and imposition of property rights are useful in settling legal and ethical 
uncertainties surrounding rightful ownership, use and consumption of resources. In an 
era characterised by overpopulation, the relevance of property rights is made even 
more pronounced as the world’s population continually expands (Mbatha, 2008). The 
world’s resources, however, are finite and can hence support only a limited populace. 
Amongst others (Kay, 1997:1447; Soroos, 1977:647), Hardin (1968:1243) discussed 
the concern of overpopulation and explained that within the world’s restricted 
parameters, the growth rate of the population must at some point in time equal zero.  
This suggests that there is an optimum population number, however difficult it may be 
to define. If the optimum population is considered to be the maximum population, it 
would mean that every person would have to give up their unnecessary luxuries in 
order to allow others to have the basics for survival, that is to say to sacrifice excess 
resources to allow a greater population to exist. In reality, few would be willing to 
tolerate such deprivation, and it follows that the optimum population would be 
considerably less than the maximum (Hardin, 1968:1243). In any event, the effective 
use of available resources at ‘optimum population’ levels would involve infinite 
distribution complexities.  
 
Each individual would demand their maximum utility; but would derive this utility 
from varying sources, and have different goods they would wish to maximize. 
Evaluating these different commodities in terms of the utility they provide is virtually 
impossible, as their differing characteristics would render them incomparable. This 
theoretical challenge can be realistically met by creating a system of weightings in 
order to assess goods, thus making them comparable (Hardin, 1968:1244). Hardin 
(1968:1244) described the criterion of this system in nature as ‘survival’, but 
explained that when applied to humanity, the greatest problem was to establish an 
 
 
acceptable measure of weightings. As yet, no thriving populace has achieved a 
solution, as evidenced by the inability of any general population to have a growth rate 
of zero for an extended period. This suggests that a solution to the optimum 
population problem may not exist (Crowe, 1969:1103 commenting on Hardin, 1968).  
 
Although some countries have experienced negative population growth rates for short 
periods, these were almost invariably caused by unusual events (war, pestilence), and 
were not due to planned population control. However, though it could be assumed that 
a positive growth rate would indicate that a specifically defined population had not 
yet achieved its optimum (Hardin, 1968:1244), in reality countries with the highest 
positive ratios are often poverty stricken and considered ‘overpopulated’ (e.g. India). 
This argues no support for the assumption that a positive growth rate illustrates a 
lower than optimum population (Hardin, 1968:1244). Gehrt (1996) and Kay (1997) 
were both in agreement with Hardin (1968) on the issue of overpopulation. However, 
Gehrt (1996:901) recognised the solution to the problem as education, whereas Kay 
(1997:1447) disagreed, saying that education or an appeal to a population’s 
conscience would never solve the problem.  
 
Adam Smith’s (1776) contribution to the argument, according to Hardin (1968:1245), 
of the ‘invisible hand’ led to the postulation that individual decisions would in turn be 
the best decisions for society as a whole. If this conclusion is viable, it creates 
justification for the current total freedom in reproduction, on the theory that 
humankind will individually and naturally control reproduction to achieve the 
optimum population. However, if the theory does not hold, possible solutions to the 
ever-increasing problem of overpopulation need to be postulated and closely 
evaluated.  
 
It is now necessary to review the theory relating to the maximisation of scarce 
resources, and how property rights have evolved to address the problem (Section 2.2). 
The different property rights regimes will be analysed in Section 2.3 in an attempt to 
discover their strengths and weaknesses, and identify the dominant regime in terms of 
the minimisation of transaction costs and overall effectiveness. Land property rights 
will be of particular interest, as the concept of the transfer of land ownership is central 
to the thesis. In Section 2.4, land reform will be considered, focusing on the 
 
 
redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa, and is followed in 2.5 by a 
discussion on market structures and their characteristics. A hypothesis is presented in 
Section 2.6, and a conclusion follows in 2.7. 
 
2.2 The tragedy of the commons 
 
One of the biggest potential difficulties associated with overpopulation is that of the 
carrying capacity of land. As the population grows, land is being placed under great 
pressure for crop production, grazing and accommodation purposes. Thus the notion 
of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ develops; where any number of individuals 
(herdsmen) make use of a common piece of land, to share its resources.  
 
If a piece of land was open to all herdsmen (i.e. open-access resource), each would try 
to keep as many livestock on the land as possible in order to maximize gain. 
According to Hardin (1968:1244), the question each would ask is “what utility will I 
gain by adding an additional animal to my herd?” The answer contains two 
components; the first being the positive proceeds obtained by the herdsman from the 
additional animal, which will almost equal + 1 (i.e. the highest positive gain in utility 
per additional animal). The second component would be a negative one, namely 
overgrazing. In this case, all of the herdsmen would share the negative aspect 
collectively, as they all utilized the same piece of land, but the individual herdsman’s 
decrease in utility would be only a small portion of – 1 (Hardin, 1968:1244).  
 
Summation of the two components would lead each rational herdsman to add an 
additional animal to his herd for his own gain. Thus by acting in his own best 
interests, he would inadvertently be bringing about the downfall of the whole, and 
herein lies the tragedy (Hardin, 1968:1244). Although the hypothesis provides a 
valuable lesson, it has been argued that in reality this situation would be avoided 
(Crowe, 1969:1104). 
 
Hardin’s (1968) conclusion was the need for property rights in land ownership. 
Although his work dates back to 1968, the concept of property rights naturally 
developed hundreds of years before, when tribes throughout the world allocated each 
other areas in which to hunt and inhabit, separated from neighbouring tribes 
 
 
(Demsetz, 1967:350). Tribes thus identified the need to separate land into bounded 
areas for their exclusive use, thus combating the problem of overexploitation. This 
early form of property rights evolved to the legislated property rights of today, while 
retaining the same basic principles. Property rights characterise the relationship 
between individuals with regard to specific resources, and allow those holding the 
rights to exclude others from using and benefiting there-from (Bromley and Cernea 
1989:5). This allows for the identification of two vital characteristics of property 
rights, namely the “rights to be included in, and to exclude others from, particular 
benefit streams” (Runge, 1984:1).  
 
Four property rights regimes have been identified in the authoritative literature, being 
open-access property, common property, private property and state property, each of 
which are individually discussed in order to recognise how they developed and 
evolved over time. Scott (1983:558) stated that “the common law calls property 
rights, a holder’s relationship to a parcel of land”. Property rights are therefore 
identified as essential in society, and refer to the ‘bundle of rights’ which govern any 
given property (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:19). They enable owners to use their land 
as collateral in order to obtain funding, to sell it to another party or to force others to 
move from the land.  
 
2.3 Property rights regimes 
 
It is clear that disorder, anarchy and even violence would be the penalty for the lack 
of an equitable system of land rights. The various options justify the following 
analyses.  
 
2.3.1 Open-access property regimes 
 
Buurman (1986:497) explained that economists subscribe to three conditions of 
ownership, namely “the right to exclude others from the use of the property, the right 
to use or change the property, and the right to transfer all or some of the rights in an 
asset through sale or rent”. In the case of open-access property, the only right that 
holds is the right to use the property, hence open-access property is said to have no 
defined group of owners, and as such, the benefit stream is available to anyone 
 
 
(Bromley, 1989:872). Open-access resources can be described more accurately as a 
situation where no property rights exist, as “everybody’s access is nobody’s property” 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989:19). It is to this property rights regime that Hardin (1968) 
drew attention in his work on ‘the tragedy of the commons’. Hardin’s use of the word 
‘commons’ was thus ambiguous, as he actually referred to open-access property, 
which as will be seen differs somewhat from communal ownership. Failure to identify 
the difference between open-access and common property led to a misunderstanding 
of these concepts and to the criticism of communal ownership accordingly.  
 
Open-access represents the earliest form of property regime, where resources 
belonged to no one, and nobody could be excluded from using them. During the time 
in which the open-access property regime is thought to have begun, resources of land, 
wildlife and water were abundant. Man was free to roam where he pleased and 
harvest as he wished. The problem this freedom created is that the cost associated 
with each individual’s consumption of the open-access resource was not calculated 
(Demsetz, 1967:353). If an individual wished to maximize the value of his rights to 
the resource, - a rational decision - he would tend to overexploit the land, and 
eventually diminish its fruits beyond repair (Demsetz, 1967:353). In those 
circumstances, it is possible that communities would get together and negotiate the 
policing of resource usage. However, the costs associated with such an agreement 
would be excessive and the enforcement of the agreement even more challenging. 
Costs would be further increased due to the system’s inability to fully account for the 
expected costs and benefits available to future generations, which would be borne by 
current users (Demsetz, 1967:354).  Thus, the effects of an individuals actions on their 
neighbours and on future generations could not be fully accounted for, explaining 
how open-access regimes would create large externalities.    
 
Open-access property regimes result from the absence of authority and management, 
and for this reason, over time, as a region’s resources decline, those that remain are 
often converted into, and managed under communal property regimes. In terms of 
transactions costs, this transition occurs when the costs associated with open-access 
property outweigh those of converting to communal ownership. In modern society, 
there remains little evidence of true open-access resources, with the air and oceans 
representing some of the few available examples (Dales, 1968:795). Dales (1968:795) 
 
 
attributed the lack of the establishment of property rights to certain resources (e.g. the 
air and the oceans) because they were not divisible or immobile like landed property, 
thus making it impossible to create an effective system of property rights. To 
conclude, open-access property regimes will probably not be effective in today’s 
world of diminishing resources, and the only instance where they may prevail is 
where the costs of creating a more controlled form of property rights regime would 
outweigh the benefits of doing so (Dales, 1968:795). 
 
2.3.2 Common property regimes 
 
Communal ownership has been defined as a right which all members of a specific 
community may exercise (Demsetz, 1967:353). This form of ownership reflects 
private property for the group, as all individuals in the community have rights and 
duties in the common property, and is characterised by the exclusion of non-owners 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989:15). The community owning the common property may 
vary greatly in size, nature and structure, but will have a method of defining 
ownership in the commons as well as having interaction and a common interest 
between its members. Such an ownership structure requires an authority system, to 
enforce compliance and protection without which the arrangement would collapse. 
The structure thus differs from that described by Hardin (1968) as ‘the tragedy of the 
commons’, in that it is managed, as opposed to the unmanaged open-access structure 
on which Hardin focused. The management required for common property results in 
greater transactions costs. For common property to be justified, the costs must not 
outweigh the benefits associated with this property rights regime.  
 
Three well known and influential studies with regard to common property regimes are 
those of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996), on which 
Agrawal (2001) focused in his work on the governance of common property 
institutions. All three of these significant authors conducted their research based on 
real life experiences over many years of study, and all concluded that community 
management of common resources can be implemented effectively (Agrawal, 
2001:5). They further specified conditions that are favourable for the success of 
common resource management, as summarised in Table 2.1 below. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Conditions identified for the success of Communal Ownership        
 
i) Small community size. 
ii) Clearly defined boundaries. 
iii) Effective and appropriate leadership. 
iv) Interdependence amongst the members of the community. 
v) An overlap between the community’s residential location, and the location of its 
resources.  
vi) Locally formulated rules of access and management. 
vii) Easy enforcement of these rules. 
viii) Accountability of the leader and his/her officials to other users. 
ix) A match between the restrictions on harvests and the generation of new 
resources. 
x) A lack of undermining of community authority by the Central Government. 
   
Source: Adapted from Agrawal (2001:1654) 
 
Although these conditions are of interest, and may well contribute to the success of 
communal ownership, there are a number of factors that were not sufficiently 
highlighted by the significant works of Wade, (1988); Ostrom, (1990); Baland and 
Platteau, (1996). Firstly, there was limited attention paid to the characteristics of the 
resources to which the common ownership related, as well as climate and 
environmental surrounds (Agrawal, 2001:1655). An important aspect relates to the 
mobility and storage of resources, where storage refers to the extent to which the 
resources can be held subsequent to being collected. For example, wildlife needs to be 
able to move over large areas, making it difficult to contain, whereas lakes are 
contained, but are not mobile. In general, problems with storage and greater mobility 
of resources make the task of common resource management more difficult by 
increasing the associated transactions costs and the unpredictability of availability.  
 
The second area of omission was that of the external physical, social and institutional 
environment (Agrawal, 2001:1655). Variation in the population levels of the 
community links directly to environmental degradation. As a community grows, a 
larger area is needed to sustain the increased number to be fed. Hence, inevitable 
population growth would generate a number of pressures on the community’s 
 
 
resources. According to Bromley (1989:873), as the community’s size increases, the 
demand for resources would eventually surpass the rate of regeneration, resulting in 
the probable collapse of the communal property regime. A further difficulty 
associated with communal structures is the potentially high cost of decision-making 
connected with obtaining agreement in a large community, which adds to the overall 
transactions costs (Bromley, 1989:873). Such size issues would tend to create a free 
rider problem, as it would be difficult to monitor who is contributing and who is not, 
further increasing transactions costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:21).  
 
With regard to the institutional environment, the development of roads, which would 
better connect the community with larger markets, may create a situation where the 
community would be confronted with cash exchanges with outsiders. This would 
result in increased production in order to generate cash income in addition to simple 
subsistence production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:24-25). The link to larger 
markets would also result inevitably in the materialisation of new technologies that 
would alter the costs and benefits available to the community (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1973:24). Generally these kinds of changing conditions result in varying objectives 
and duties between individuals in the community and power struggles between 
subgroups may consequently occur. As the community develops, alliances may be 
created with outsiders in an attempt to control or privatise the ‘common’ resources. In 
short, it is clear that changes in market, institutional and population related factors 
may greatly affect the sustainability of the commons (Agrawal, 2001:1656).  
 
Bromley and Cernea (1989:18) highlighted a further concern with respect to 
communal ownership. The central Government’s attitude towards common property 
regimes is completely beyond the community’s control. If the modern state has little 
regard for the interests of the groups reliant on common property regimes, external 
threats to the commons would receive less response than matters in which the 
government had more interest, such as private property. The state’s willingness to 
attend to and protect certain property regimes can be partly explained by their opinion 
of the relative importance of the citizens incorporated within these property regimes. 
If the poorer, subsistence farmers generally associated with communal ownership are 
regarded as insignificant within the greater economy, as is the case in many countries, 
then the communal property regimes of which they are part, would receive little 
 
 
protection against threats from others (Bromley and Cernea, 1989:18). Hence, Table 
2.2 identifies the following the additional factors that may be vital for the success of 
communal resource ownership. 
 
Table 2.2 Additional conditions necessary for the success of Communal Ownership  
 
i) Focus on resources with low levels of mobility. 
ii) Benefits from the resource should be storable.  
iii) Predictability of resource availability. 
iv) Low poverty levels. 
v) Low levels of demand by users. 
vi) Gradual change in the levels of user demand. 
vii) Adaptation time for new technologies available to the commons. 
viii) Low levels of communication with external markets. 
ix) Gradual change in the level of communication with external markets. 
x) A degree of support from the Central Government. 
 
Source: Adapted from Agrawal (2001:1659) 
 
After considering all conditions identified in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, it is clear that 
for communal ownership to be successful, a significant quantity of positive 
requirements have to be met, to promote the effectiveness of the property rights 
regime. However, as recognized by the studies of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) and 
Baland and Platteau (1996), communal ownership can be successful in reality.  
 
2.3.3 Private property regimes 
 
Increased pressure on open-access resources and growing competition amongst the 
community for such resources creates greater externalities among users. The general 
response to these inefficient circumstances is to restrict outsider’s access to local 
resources. However within the confines of a growing population, this option is rarely 
sufficient, and to prevent further losses or resource exhaustion two alternatives are 
available (Baland and Platteau, 1998:644). The first involves the regulation of the 
open-access resource, and the creation of the communal ownership structure 
discussed above. The second option entails accepting the division of the commons, 
 
 
and the subsequent emergence of individual private rights that will ensure 
excludability. Private property rights can therefore be defined as a system where the 
regulations governing control of and access to resources are arranged around the idea 
that resources are separate and divisible facilities, each belonging to a particular 
individual, however not overlooking corporate property, which although governed by 
a group, is also private property (Waldron, 1985:327). Private ownership further 
embraces the legal ability to exclude others, and permits owners to force additional 
interested parties to stay away from their private holdings and search for alternatives 
(Bromley and Cernea, 1989: 12).    
 
In the absence of transaction costs, the two property rights solutions are in theory 
equivalent and would lead to Pareto Efficiency. The assumption of zero transaction 
costs is however unrealistic, and the higher costs generally associated with collective 
decision-making are said to tilt the balance in favour of the private property regime 
(Baland and Platteau, 1998:645). The private property rights school thus asserts that 
as scarcity increases the value of a resource, a point would be reached where the gains 
from privatisation exceed the costs. An important aspect of these gains arises 
precisely because all the governance costs associated with communal ownership are 
avoided (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:22). These costs specifically refer to the 
organisation of the group and the reaching of collective agreement, and are thus 
expected to be higher when a group is large or has conflicting goals (Baland and 
Platteau, 1998:645).  
 
Private property rights result in fewer users, less room for external effects and 
therefore lower governance costs and inefficiencies. The reduced number of users 
decreases the pressure on resources, allowing regeneration and less chance of 
overexploitation, assuming that the owners do not require a large portion of the 
resources for subsistence use. Further, due to higher stakes held by owners within the 
resources, there is more of a profit motive, and efficiency will be optimised as the 
owners work for their own benefit, as opposed to the benefit of the group as a whole 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:22). Profitability of private property is enhanced due to 
greater commercialisation of resources, as owners are less reliant on the resources for 
personal consumption, increasing their realisable value. In conclusion, the one-to-one 
relationship between owner’s actions and their final effects, which private property 
 
 
regimes create, enables the internalisation of many of the externalities associated with 
communal property regimes (Baland and Platteau, 1998:645).    
 
However, the benefits identified above must be weighed against the potential costs of 
privatisation. Firstly, a large percentage of the world’s land shortage cases are not 
related to a physical lack of land, but rather to the high concentration of land owned 
by a minority of powerful individuals. This raises normative questions on the morality 
of such a situation, as the land owned by one individual could otherwise provide 
accommodation and livelihood for a much larger group of people. Secondly, it is 
argued that private ownership results in the most efficient use of resources. However, 
Bromley and Cernea (1989:13) highlighted that in certain countries, the best land is 
devoted to activities that yield the highest rates of return, like cattle farming, while 
crop farming and alternative activities must take place on poorer quality lands, 
placing greater pressures on their success. Privatisation therefore takes place on all the 
best, most arable land, leaving the inferior land to other property regimes. For this 
reason, it is often unfair to compare the performance of private property with 
communal property, as the latter cannot be expected to be equally successful if it is 
taking place on inferior resource bases (Bromley and Cernea, 1989:13). Situations 
such as these cast doubts on the validity of the hypothesis that private property 
regimes automatically result in greater efficiency, although in other cases, where land 
usage is not skewed, increased efficiency may well occur (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1973:22).   
 
Additional costs involved in privatisation include those of defining and enforcing 
private property rights. As the size of the resource grows, and the number of people 
overseeing it decreases, the costs associated with monitoring and enforcing private 
property rise accordingly (Baland and Platteau, 1998:645). Moreover, the actual 
process of dividing large resources into smaller private holdings involves further 
costs, and in many cases an additional loss of economies of scale. Many wildlife 
species require large areas in which to survive, and a decrease in the size of their 
habitat may hinder their viability. On the other hand if these resources were not 
divided (i.e. there was communal ownership), holders of rights could shift use 
between alternate areas based on seasonality, and in this way reduce the risk of 
resource degradation. The process of privatisation can therefore be said to have a 
 
 
number of potential problems, and a choice between property regimes must weigh up 
all costs and benefits carefully. However, all the property rights regimes discussed 
thus far have benefits and pitfalls, but the ability of private property to internalise a 
greater number of externalities tends to tilt the balance in favour of private ownership.  
 
Private ownership also has a number of different forms that will be briefly discussed 
in an effort to understand how they may vary, as well as the benefits of each variant. 
The focus is on private property rights in land management as apposed to all other 
property, as land is the central focus of the thesis. Firstly, small-scale operations, 
which would usually be managed as family farms. Kuhnen (1982:6) held that this 
form of private property has been very effective in terms of production and the social 
environment of farming in general. The main reason for such success is that all 
members of the family work towards a common goal, making their own decisions and 
receiving the benefits of their own work. The result is a greater incentive to succeed 
and a positive working environment.  
 
Secondly, for large holdings, the owner would often hire others to work the land and 
still receive a sufficient income, but would be centrally involved, and oversee 
operations personally (Kuhnen, 1982:7). This close owner-work relationship creates a 
strong profit motive and explains why this form of private property has been 
successful in terms of production.  
 
Finally, farm tenancy where land is leased from the owner for a specific period of 
time, allowing a tenant to harvest its fruits. This form occurs mostly in countries that 
are densely populated, and are characterised by large privately owned resources, 
where owners have enough land to lease portions out to others while maintaining 
sections for themselves (Kuhnen, 1982:7-8). Payment for the rental of such land can 
occur in various forms, including; 
a) Occupational tenancy, where the lessee works on the owners land, a portion of 
which time is considered as payment of rent. 
b) Cash tenancy, which involves the payment of a fixed cash rental.  
c) Rent in kind,  which refers to payment via a fixed amount of produce from the 
land, and  
 
 
d) Share tenancy, where the overall quantity of produce is divided up between 
owner and tenant in a predetermined ratio (Kuhnen, 1982:8).  
 
Private property is therefore characterised by a greater degree of complexity and a 
number of varying structures when compared to alternative property rights regimes. 
As with all such regimes however, private property involves transactions costs, 
although authoritative literature (Baland and Platteau, 1998:645) suggests that such 
associated costs tend to be lower than those within additional property rights 
arrangements.  
 
2.3.4 State property regimes 
 
Where the state has control over resources, and determines the rules pertaining to their 
use (Bromley, 1989:872), the state has the right to exclude anyone from using the 
resource, provided the correct procedure for denying access is followed (Demsetz, 
1967:353). Alchian and Demsetz (1973:18) observed that the degree of centralisation 
in a country is closely linked to the extent to which property rights are owned by the 
state.  
 
The main arguments against state ownership have been based on the costs and 
inefficiencies associated with this form of property rights regime. Firstly, when 
resources are owned by the state, government departments are usually assigned the 
duties of overseeing them. Government employees have very little incentive to 
minimise costs or improve the quality of resources, as they have no immediate vested 
interest. Peters (1981:76) suggests that the absence of a profit motive and the lack of 
profit as a measurement of effectiveness generate further problems such as managerial 
dysfunction. In the case of private ownership however, there are strong incentives for 
owners to reduce costs and increase efficiency, resulting in greater profits. Privately 
owned resources would thus tend to be more efficient than those controlled by the 
state, and it would make little sense for the state to opt for management when superior 
outputs could be produced at lower costs by private firms. Shleifer’s (1998:10) 
evidence on privatisation supported the claim that it produces greater quality and 
efficiency of output. Bromley (1989:873) concurred, noting that the record of state 
management had in general been very disappointing, and had in fact resulted in a 
 
 
degradation of resources. Shleifer (1998:10) highlighted a lack of innovation and an 
inability within government to try to resolve this matter. Indeed, Peters (1981:70) 
identified a natural tendency for government to maintain the status quo simply in 
order to show commitment to procedures. Yet innovation is vital for the success of a 
property rights regime, because without it, the growth of knowledge and ideas is 
retarded. The lack of emphasis on innovation strongly mitigates against state property 
regimes.  
 
One of the strongest reasons for privatisation is to eradicate politically motivated 
resource allocation (Shleifer, 1998:19). For any government, retaining political 
support to remain in office is essential and one way to do this is by directing benefits 
(or political patronage) to their political supporters (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 
1997:468). This form of bestowing favour by influential parties has long been used 
throughout the world, whether by direct enrichment or unearned preferment. 
Governments have used their control of state firms to direct benefits to their 
supporters, with results detrimental to social welfare, and reduced efficiency (Shleifer, 
1998:19; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993:616). In addition, the officials within government 
agencies often succumb to bribery to support their own incomes (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993:616). The resulting corruption provides a government that is unable to regulate, 
contract or run enterprises for public benefit visibly providing further evidence 
against state controlled property regimes.   
 
Within a state controlled property regime, where a large degree of centralisation 
exists, the entire country is viewed and managed as a single unit, meaning that 
individual, cultural and geographic needs are not readily understood or 
accommodated (Abedian and Biggs, 1998:93). On the other hand, a decentralised 
system of private property rights can cater for specific geographic needs, improved 
resource allocation and efficiency, as the supervising individuals within each area 
would have better knowledge of its available resources and their sustainability (Black 
et al., 1999:314).  
 
There are however circumstances where state ownership of resources are appropriate.  
 
 
In instances where incentives for cost reduction predominate and will greatly reduce 
the quality and efficiency of services (e.g. police, prisons, emergency services, 
hospitals), a substantial element of state involvement is essential (Shleifer, 1998:19). 
 
The authoritative literature suggests that both open-access and state controlled 
resources have the greatest number of deficiencies, leaving communal property and 
private property as potential solutions to the property rights question. However, as 
discussed, the higher cost of decision-making associated with communal property 
tends to shift the balance in favour of private property, although research dictates that 
communal ownership can be effective given certain conditions (see Table 2.1 and 
2.2). Table 2.3 summarises the benefits and pitfalls of the property rights regimes 
discussed, and attributes these points to particular aspects of each regime. 
 
Table 2.3 Summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the property rights 
regimes 
 Main Advantages Attributed to Main Disadvantages Attributed to 
Open-access 
Property 
 
- None            - - Overexploitation 
- Inability to account for   
  future generations 
- No defined  
 group of owners 
- User group is  
  too large 
Common 
Property 
 
- Managed i.e. access is 
  restricted  
- Less exploitation   
- Excludability of 
  non-owners 
 
- Large transactions  
  costs  
- Overexploitation in the  
  long term as the   
  community grows too   
  large 
- Large user  
  group 
Private  
Property 
 
- Reduced transactions  
  costs  
- Less chance of  
  overexploitation  
- Greater efficiency and 
  profit motive 
- Excludability of 
  non-owners 
- Small user  
  group 
- Large monitoring and  
  enforcement costs 
- Inequitable i.e. High  
  concentration of land   
  owned by relatively  
  few individuals 
- User group  
  may be too  
  small 
 
State  
Property 
 
- Strict management of  
  resources  
 
- Excludability of 
  any potential  
  user by the state 
- Weak incentives to  
  minimise costs or  
  generate profits 
- Lack of innovation 
- Politically motivated  
  resource allocation 
- Servants of the  
  state have no   
  ownership link  
  to the resource 
- The need to be  
  re-elected 
 
 
A society may at any point in time, experience all or some of the varying property 
rights regimes on different areas of land. Changes in factors such as technology, 
political struggles and population dynamics, however, could generate alterations to 
 
 
the assignment of these property rights (Feder and Feeny, 1991:146). Taking into 
account the problems of overpopulation and resource scarcity, a more even 
distribution of property rights is justifiable in many countries. One of the main 
government policies that can result in the transfer and/or redefinition of large 
quantities of property rights over a relatively short time span is the process of land 
reform.  
 
2.4 Land reform 
 
The term ‘reform’ refers to change, or more accurately, “an institutional innovation 
promoted by the ruling order in an attempt to overcome economic or political 
contradictions” (de Janvry, 1981:384-385). ‘Land reform’, which is simply a division 
of reform, transfers land, authority and status from one component of the community 
to another through redistribution (Flores, 1970:899). In a narrow sense, land reform is 
concerned with the changing of land ownership from concentration within the hands 
of a few, to diffusion into the hands of many (Harris, 1969:49). The process thus 
undertakes to continuously shift and/or redefine property rights, as well as their trade.  
Harris (1969:50) further argues that a link exists between land reform and reform 
within government and society: describing how land reform may act as a catalyst 
resulting in economic and social improvement. Barlowe (1953:173) concurred stating, 
“land reform often is treated as a necessary or highly desirable condition of economic 
development.”  
 
Land reforms can be grouped into three main categories:   
1) Firstly, reforms that encompass some redistribution of land, but do not alter 
the class of citizen in control of the land or the production dynamics (i.e. type 
and/or intensity of land usage).  The result is purely a transfer of property 
rights (Tuma, 1963:266; de Janvry, 1981:385).  
 
2) Secondly, reforms which not only involve redistribution, but also change the 
production dynamics of the land (e.g. a shift from subsistence to commercial 
activities), while no alteration to the class of citizen in control is undertaken 
(Ground and de Janvry, 1978:93).  
 
 
 
3) Lastly, reforms where redistribution occurs, production dynamics may or may 
not be altered but most importantly, land is transferred to citizens from 
different social classes (i.e. from the wealthy to the disadvantaged) (Ground 
and de Janvry, 1978, 93). In this case, property rights are not only transferred, 
but also redefined. Such property may be developed into a communal project, 
or alternatively distributed to small landowners thus helping transform 
subsistence livelihoods into commercial ventures through the provision of 
additional land and guidance (Tuma, 1963:266). This type of land reform 
constitutes the main component of the South African land reform programme.  
 
In addition to these major categories of land reform, a further far less common form 
exists. Counter-reforms have the opposite effect of general land reforms in that they 
aim to reduce the concentration of land, or alternatively transform commercial 
operations back to subsistence activities (Deere and Leon, 2001:34; de Janvry, 
1981:388). Ground and de Janvry (1978:98) held that the only situation which may 
warrant such a reform is where a serious shortage of labour exists, illustrating why in 
the modern world, with its ongoing population explosion, such reforms are extremely 
rare.   
 
Although the discussion of land reform thus far has revealed a number of its goals, a 
more direct look at the objectives is necessary.  The goals can be categorised as 
follows: 
 
1) Economic goals – Include enhanced levels of output and market efficiency, 
greater incomes, a system of fair prices for both consumer and producer, 
increased gross domestic product (GDP) and a more favourable balance of 
payments for the country as a whole (Feder, 1965:116; Flores, 1970:899).   
 
2) Social goals – Attempt to achieve a more even distribution of income, 
resources and wealth, increased access to information and education and more 
equitable bargaining power amongst purchasers and suppliers of every class 
(Flores, 1970:899).  
 
 
 
3) Political goals – May be more complicated, but should generally include the 
guaranteeing of certain rights, such as the right to land and education, the 
abolition of  feudal or semi-feudal requirements and an end to the 
mistreatment of minorities or disadvantaged groups (Feder, 1965:116). Further 
political goals include the fulfilment of outstanding promises made by the 
ruling party at the time of election and the spreading of political power 
through a more even land distribution (Nelson, 1993:857).  
 
It is therefore evident that land reforms are complex arrangements, which may differ 
in many ways. However, they all share the common goals of land redistribution and a 
more equitable land ownership structure.  
 
2.5 Market structure 
 
Market structure describes the condition of a market with respect to its competition.  
The different market structures can be distinguished by the following criteria: 
1) The number and size of the participants, being buyers/consumers and 
sellers/producers, 
2) The characteristics of the goods and services traded, 
3) The extent to which information is freely available,  
4) Barriers to entry and exit (Sutton, 2006:1-17; Bnet, 2008:1). 
 
Each of the relevant market structures are discussed below. 
 
2.5.1 Perfect competition 
 
A perfectly competitive market is one in which no individual buyer or seller has a 
degree of market power. They are characterised by the following aspects: 
a) Many willing buyers and sellers, 
b) Barriers to entry and exit are low, 
c) Products traded by different firms are exactly the same (homogeneous), 
d) Firms aim to maximise profits, 
e) All participants have perfect information (Robinson, 1934:104-105; 
Chamberlin, 1937:566; McNulty, 1968:642). 
 
 
 
The result is that no single participant has any influence over the price of the goods it 
buys/sells, and firms are thus price takers (McNulty, 1968:641). If a firm were to 
increase its sales price, consumers would simply move to a competitor, and the firm 
selling at above market rates would lose profits and market share (Robinson, 
1934:113). In the long-term, it is impossible for firms to earn excess profits1 in a 
perfectly competitive market. This is because if firms are generating such profits in 
the short-term, it will signal other firms to enter the market, increasing competition, 
and driving down profits to a normal level (Robinson, 1934:106-107). Perfectly 
competitive markets will achieve both productive and allocative efficiency in the 
long-term, however, in reality due to its assumptions very few (perhaps none) of these 
markets exist (McNulty, 1968:641-643).  
 
2.5.2 Monopoly 
 
A monopoly exists where a specific firm or participant (seller) has enough market 
power over a good to determine the price or terms at which others can access this 
product or service. Monopolies are characterised by the following main attributes: 
a) Large barriers to entry for sellers/producers resulting in a lack of competition, 
b) Poor or no viable substitutes, 
c) Many buyers, 
d) Profit maximisation (Black et. al., 1999:34-37; Economist, 2008b:1).  
 
The result is that the monopolist gains a far greater market share than would be the 
case in a perfectly competitive environment. In a pure monopoly, a single firm 
produces the entire supply, and is able to influence the price of the good by adjusting 
the quantity supplied (Economist, 2008b:1). In this instance, the monopolist is 
described as a ‘price maker’. Monopolies are inefficient because they sell 
                                                 
1 “Economists distinguish between normal profit and excess profit. Normal profit is the opportunity 
cost of the entrepreneur, the amount of profit just sufficient to keep the firm in business. If profit is any 
lower than that, the enterprise would be better off engaged in some alternative economic activity. 
Excess profit, also known as super-normal profit, is profit above normal profit and is usually evidence 
that the firm enjoys some market power that allows it to be more profitable than it would be in a market 
with perfect competition” (Economist, 2008a:1). 
 
 
 
comparatively fewer goods at higher prices than competitive markets, and make 
super-normal profits (Black et. al., 1999:35).   
 
2.5.3 Oligopoly 
 
Similar to a monopoly, an oligopoly is a market in which a small number of sellers 
dominate, as opposed to one (Probert, 2008:1). Oligopolies are thus characterised by 
the same main attributes as monopolies, being:  
a) Large barriers to entry for sellers/producers resulting in a lack of competition, 
b) Poor or no viable substitutes, 
c) Many buyers, 
d) Profit maximisation (Black et. al., 1999:40; Economy, 2008:1). 
 
Collectively the few sellers control the entire market share, but none of them 
necessarily has more power over the others. The result is that each firm’s decisions 
influence, and are influenced by the decisions of every other firm. Hence, individual 
sellers actions must always take into account the likely response of their rivals (Alston 
et. al., 1997:1254). Oligopolies are therefore always at risk of colluding and acting as 
a cartel, allowing them to collectively control production and influence sales prices 
(Economist, 2008c:1). One of the major reasons for collusion is to stabilise prices, and 
make revenue more predictable. For example, if prices fall too much, the cartel simply 
cuts production until prices rise to their desired level. Like monopolies, oligopolies 
will tend to be inefficient, especially if collusion takes place, as they will make 
abnormal profits by selling comparatively fewer goods at higher prices than 
competitive markets (Alston et. al., 1997:1259; Economist, 2008c:1).    
 
2.5.4 Monopsony 
 
A monopsony market structure represents the opposite of a monopoly, as there is only 
one buyer of a certain commodity or service, who interacts with many sellers 
(Bhaskar et. al., 2002:156). Monopsonies exist due to the following major 
characteristics: 
a) Large barriers to entry for buyers/consumers resulting in a lack of competition, 
b) Many sellers, 
 
 
c) Profit maximisation (Atkinson and Kerkvliet, 1989:251; Bhaskar et. al., 
2002:168).   
 
A Monopsonist has a large degree of market power, because by adjusting its quantity 
demanded the firm can influence the price of the goods or services purchased 
(Feldman and Wholey, 2001:8). Like monopolies, they will tend to be inefficient 
(creating deadweight losses) because relative to competitive markets a lesser quantity 
of goods will be purchased at a lower price (Alston et. al., 1997:1262).  
 
2.5.5 Oligopsony 
 
Oligopsonies are similar to monopsonies, however as opposed to there being a single 
buyer; instead, a few dominant buyers exist, and interact with a theoretically large 
number of sellers (Murray, 1995:486). An oligopsony market structure typically 
displays the following characteristics: 
a) Large barriers to entry for buyers/consumers resulting in a lack of competition, 
b) Many sellers, 
c) Profit maximisation (Bhaskar and To, 1999:192; Murray, 1995:486).  
 
Oligopsonies generally exist where a few buyers/consumers compete with one another 
to purchase goods or production inputs (Bhaskar, et. al., 2002:156). The result is that 
the buyers have a large degree of power over the sellers, and can use this to their 
advantage (DFIT, 2008:1). They can instruct the sellers as to when they want to take 
delivery, the quantity required and the specifications of these goods. Their market 
power also means that oligopsonies pass on most of the risks of stockpiling due to 
varying demand and other losses to the producers. They have the ability to reduce 
costs by shopping around, sourcing inputs from different suppliers and playing then 
off against each other. As is the case of all the market structures discussed thus far 
(with the exception of perfect competition), oligopsonies represent a form of 
imperfect competition, and will be inefficient. This inefficiency stems from the fact 
that fewer goods will be purchased at a lower price relative to a competitive market 
(Just and Chern, 1980:600).   
 
 
 
Table 2.4 illustrates a summary of the market structures discussed, and the important 
attributes of each. 
 
Table 2.4 Market structures overview 
Market structure 
Number of 
sellers 
Number of 
buyers 
Entry 
barriers - 
Sellers 
Entry 
barriers - 
Buyers 
Who has 
market 
power 
Perfect competition Many Many No No No one 
Monopoly One Many Yes No Seller 
Oligopoly Few Many Yes No Sellers 
Monopsony Many One No Yes Buyer 
Oligopsony Many Few No Yes Buyers 
Source: Adapted from Robinson, 1934:104-105; Black et. al., 1999:34-40; Bhaskar et. 
al., 2002:168; Bhaskar and To, 1999:192.  
 
Market structures are thus an important determinant of which participants have power 
in a given environment, and whether it is the buyers or sellers that can influence the 
prices at which goods and services are traded.  
 
2.6 Hypothesis  
 
The thesis aims to investigate: 
1) The prices paid in the South African redistribution market versus the 
ordinary land market with reference to Northern KwaZulu-Natal, and   
2)  The changes in the levels of productivity of redistributed farms  
     ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘post’ transfer of ownership.   
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
The current overpopulation of the world, and the potential concerns associated with 
identifying the optimal population have been presented. Property rights, which 
evolved to address the resulting competition for scarce resources, were then analysed, 
and the varying forms of property rights regimes were examined. This analysis 
concluded that private property rights and communal ownership were the two most 
 
 
potentially viable regimes to maximise scarce resources, and minimise externalities 
within the context of the modern world.  
 
The aforementioned combination of overpopulation and resource scarcity has led a 
number of countries to implement land reform policies in an attempt to more fairly 
redistribute the country’s resources within its population. The varying types of land 
reform, together with the far-reaching goals that this policy may seek to address have 
been presented. In this regard, the type of land reform utilised in South Africa has 
been identified. The concept of market structure has been discussed, the relevant 
variations briefly explored and a hypothesis presented.   
  
Chapter three follows, discussing the methods employed in the research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
                 
 
METHODS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the chapter the research methods used to collect, analyse and present data are 
given. A case study is presented on the majority of land redistribution sales 
transactions involving sugarcane farmland in two of KwaZulu-Natal’s municipal 
districts, Uthungulu and iLembe, with focus on the period 2002 to 2007. The topics of 
greatest importance were the prices at which farmland changed hands and the 
productivity on these farms during and after transfers.  
 
The methods surrounding the sample area and the data for the case study are 
discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Section 3.3.2 draws particular attention 
to the data on prices, while 3.3.3 looks specifically at productivity. Section 3.4 ends 
the chapter with a summary of the salient methods employed in the research.  
 
3.2 Motivation for selected sample area  
 
The Northern KwaZulu-Natal region was chosen as the site of the study for the 
following reasons: 
a) A large number of land redistribution transactions have taken place since 
2002. For example in the 2002 to 2006 period alone, approximately thirty land 
transactions took place in the Uthungulu and iLembe districts 
b)  Access to farms and public authorities was easier because of previous work 
experience in this area 
c) Familiarity with geographical, political and business cultures of the area. 
 
Transactions were grouped by way of district municipality, with the Uthungulu and 
iLembe districts representing the chosen sample regions. The majority of the land 
redistribution cases in Northern KwaZulu-Natal took place within these two districts. 
 
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Data collection 
 
A combination of assistance from the Department of Land Affairs, Inkezo Land 
Company, the South African Cane Growers Association and structured formal and 
informal interviews were the primary methods through which data on land 
transactions were obtained. It was agreed by the researcher and farmers to keep their 
identities anonymous. Hence, some business documents and information were 
modified without compromising authenticity to ensure identities were not revealed.  
 
Data on South Africa’s market prices were obtained via the 2008 Abstract of 
Agricultural Statistics, published by the National Department of Agriculture. Because 
of a lack of data capturing and archiving, a Department of Agriculture representative   
acknowledged that data was only available until 2005, and that this lack of 
information had been an ongoing problem since 2006 (NDA, 2008b).  
 
Data concerning the price movements in the Uthungulu and iLembe districts were 
obtained from Cane Growers (2008a) and was available until 2006. The data used to 
establish the market price of sugarcane farmland in each district from 2000-2006 were 
based on property transfers registered with the Sugar Industry Administration Board. 
With respect to productivity, data on the sugarcane farms that were included in the 
study were also obtained from Cane Growers (2008c) for the period 1997 up to and 
including 2007.  
 
In the case studies, sellers were classified into three categories, namely: 
a) Private individuals  
b) Small companies, and  
c) Large corporations 
 
Small companies were defined as those which were not listed on a stock exchange, 
local or international, and owned property valued at less than R100 million.  
 
Large corporations were defined as those which were either listed on an exchange or 
controlled property in excess of R100 million. 
 
 
3.3.2 Presentation and analysis of Prices 
 
Data from the case studies of the Uthungulu and iLembe districts were presented 
separately. A single table was constructed for each district, containing sales by private 
individuals and small companies. An additional table was created for the iLembe 
district containing data on sales by a large corporation.  The Uthungulu district had no 
recorded land redistribution sales by large corporations. For comparison, prices paid 
were displayed per hectare of yield, and these were considered only for the sugarcane 
farmland purchased. These prices were exclusive of the price of any buildings, 
machinery, equipment and VAT (value-added tax).  
 
To ensure the same measure of comparison and because the land redistribution 
transactions took place over several years, prices were compared with the market 
price of sugarcane farmland for the corresponding year of sale (e.g. the iLembe 
district’s 2002 redistribution prices vs. its 2002 market price). From this data, it was 
established whether a premium or discount in relation to the market price was paid in 
each case, and the extent of the differences is displayed in percentage form. To 
account for the differing yields between farms, the average production per hectare 
(tons) for the year of sale, and the three years prior to sale, was calculated and divided 
into the price paid per hectare. The result was a land redistribution price paid per 
hectare of yield (tons) based on a four-year average production performance history. 
This figure was taken as a true reflection of the land redistribution value placed on 
each farm, and allowed assessments to be made on comparable bases. The method 
was then applied to other sugarcane farmland sales in which the government was not 
involved, establishing the market price per hectare of yield (four-year) in each district.  
 
The result was two independent sets of data, with no overlapping transactions. The 
first set included redistribution transactions involving the government (buyer) and a 
seller. The second data set was comprised of market transactions involving two 
independent parties, neither of which was in any way government affiliated.  
 
An additional variable was established in each table giving the value placed on every 
farm by an independent valuer prior to redistributive sale. During the research process 
a minimum of ten different valuers were identified as having assessed at least one of 
 
 
the farms incorporated in the case study. The valuation reports formed part of the 
documentation submitted to the Department of Land Affairs when assessing whether 
or not to accept the farmer’s asking price. A variable labelled ‘year of sale for 
valuation purposes’ was created showing the year in which the majority of the 
transaction took place, or more specifically the period in which the valuation was 
conducted. This year was essential in the analysis because the valuations played a 
major role in determining the final sale prices, and thus presented the link between the 
land redistribution price and the comparative market price.  
 
A single table for the Uthungulu district was created presenting ten land redistribution 
transactions involving private individuals and small companies. A total of 1207 
hectares of sugarcane farmland were included, representing a sizeable sample area 
and the sum total of all land redistribution transactions for which there was available 
data.  
 
Two tables were created for the iLembe district. The first table illustrates 
redistributive sales by private individuals and small companies. A total of 2488 
hectares of sugarcane farmland were included, constituting more than double the 
sample area that was obtained for the Uthungulu district.    
 
The second data table from the iLembe district presented land redistribution 
transactions where the seller was a large corporation. Although in the table all seven 
deals were treated separately, some formed sub-parts of one large farm that was 
divided up into five portions for sales purposes (Table 4.7). For all practical purposes, 
this data was analysed using a single observation of transactions involving one large 
corporation.  
 
A total of 27 land redistribution sales involving sugarcane farmland were analysed 
over the period 2002-2006, from a total of 32 transactions2 which have collectively 
occurred in the Uthungulu and iLembe districts since 1994. The redistribution deals 
represent cases where the farming of sugarcane was the primary land usage prior to 
selling to the government, and remained so subsequent to sale.  
                                                 
2 Five of the transactions were not included due to a lack of sufficient data. 
 
 
 
In order to determine whether there was any relationship between redistribution prices 
and market rates, the research intended to make use of causality and correlation 
analysis. Econometric or statistical causality refers to a relationship between two (or 
more) variables, where one variable is a direct consequence of the other, or vice versa 
(Gujarati, 2003:696). Causality is, however, a largely philosophical concept, 
controversial to say the least, and ranges from an extreme view where some believe 
‘everything causes everything’, to others who deny its existence altogether (Gujarati, 
2003:696). Closely related to the concept of causality is correlation analysis, which 
aims to determine the strength of any linear association between two variables 
(Gujarati, 2003:23). Correlation analysis presented the perfect tool to determine the 
extent to which market and redistribution prices were related. 
 
3.3.3 Presentation and analysis of Productivity 
 
The productivity cases correspond directly to those of prices that is to say the same 
farm units that were analysed for prices were also analysed for productivity. The data 
presentation and analysis focused on three periods of the land redistribution process, 
which were: 
a) ‘Before’ farm takeover i.e. the three years prior to the ‘year of transfer’, in which 
production was fully accounted for by the previous owners. 
b) ‘During’ the year of transfer i.e. the year where output was accounted for by both 
the past and previous owners, as physical transfer of ownership took place during this 
period. 
c) ‘Post’ transfer i.e. the years following the year of transfer, where output was fully 
accounted for by the new proprietors (in this period, the number of years varied per 
case).    
 
The variable labelled ‘average production prior to takeover’ indicated output per 
hectare (tons) for the three years prior to sale. This average was used to ascertain 
whether production increased or decreased during or after takeover. Data for this 
period were available for all cases under study.  
 
 
 
The ‘production during the year of takeover’ variable gave the average output per 
hectare in the year the farms changed hands. In this period, the previous owners 
would have been responsible for production for part of the year, while the remainder 
was accounted for by the new proprietors. ‘During the year of takeover’ data were 
presented for 27 original cases excluding one case from the Uthungulu district, the 
data for which was not available (U9).  
 
The ‘average production post takeover’ was analysed based on the tons of sugarcane 
produced per hectare per year. In this case, the number of years included in each case 
varied, depending on the year in which the new growers took over. Based on whether 
output increased or decreased ‘post takeover’, the percentage change in the average 
production is included as a variable in each table. Production data in the ‘post 
transfer’ period were presented and analysed for seven of the Uthungulu district’s ten 
original land redistribution transactions involving private individuals and small 
companies. The corresponding data for the iLembe district were presented and 
analysed for nine of a possible ten cases. Post transfer, productivity data based on 
sales by a large corporation in the iLembe district were presented and analysed 
separately.   
 
A variable was identified and labelled a ‘best observed level of output’ for each farm. 
The variable gave the highest annual number of tons produced per hectare over the 
period 1999-2007, and acted as a gauge of the productive capability of each farm. By 
comparing this level of output to that produced for the periods ‘before’, ‘during’ and 
‘after’ transfers it was possible to evaluate whether the farms were producing 
significantly close to, above or below the identified ‘optimum’ levels. A production of 
within five tons per hectare was accepted as significantly ‘close to’ optimum levels. 
Other levels were identified as either below or above the ‘best observed level of 
output’. 
 
 
 
Making use of the published recoverable value 3(RV) per ton of sugarcane for the 
applicable years, the rand value of any income lost due to a lapse in production could 
be calculated.   
 
3.4 Summary  
 
By contrasting the redistributive ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ cases with independent 
market-based transactions, data were generated enabling the analysis of the prices that 
were paid for sugarcane farmland through land redistribution. The extent to which 
land redistribution prices were above or below ordinary market rates could then be 
calculated.  
 
A comparison of output (tons) per hectare ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ transfer 
allowed for an assessment of the productivity of the farms in question, and whether it 
had been positively or negatively affected by land redistribution.  
 
The chapter that follows presents the case studies of the Uthungulu and iLembe 
district’s sugarcane farmland sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 An indication of the gross income (R) a farmer should receive per ton of sugarcane produced, and is 
specific to each year.  
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
            
 
CASE STUDY OF KWAZULU-NATAL’S SUGARCANE 
FARMLAND SALES 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The case study of two of Northern KwaZulu-Natal’s sugarcane districts illustrates that 
in the Uthungulu district, six of the ten land redistribution deals involving private 
individuals and small companies took place at an average of 42% above the ordinary 
market price. Whilst in the iLembe district’s sales by private individuals and small 
companies, seven of the ten transactions were concluded at an average premium of 
38% above the market rate. Data on sales by a large corporation in the iLembe district 
deviated from the established trend, and showed that the seven deals concluded took 
place at an average discount to market of approximately 4%.  
 
Results on productivity show that in the Uthungulu district, output declined ‘post 
takeover’ in six of the seven cases by an average of 39%.  Farms sold in the iLembe 
district by private individuals and small companies showed significantly reduced 
productivity after transfer in two of the nine cases by 33% and 66% respectively. 
However, ‘during the year of takeover’, production per hectare dropped in the 
majority of cases (i.e. 12 of 19) in both the Uthungulu and iLembe district’s sales by 
private individuals and small companies. Data on a large corporation in the iLembe 
district showed that three of the seven farms included registered declines in output per 
hectare post transfer, whilst only one showed reduced productivity ‘during the year of 
takeover’ thus differing somewhat from the previous cases.  
 
Section 4.2 begins with a description of KwaZulu-Natal and the contribution of its 
agricultural sector (specifically the sugarcane industry) to the South African economy. 
Section 4.3 details the two types of land redistribution transactions studied, whilst 
land redistribution’s basic price determination process is then described in 4.4. Trends 
in South Africa’s general farmland prices follow in Section 4.5, and are supplemented 
 
 
in 4.6 by trends in the price of sugarcane farmland in the Uthungulu and iLembe 
districts. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 present and analyse the data on prices and productivity 
respectively, which are followed by a conclusion in 4.9.    
 
4.2 Area description - KwaZulu-Natal 
 
KwaZulu-Natal is situated in the eastern part of South Africa along the coastline that 
borders the Indian Ocean. Figure 4.1 below shows a map of KwaZulu-Natal, drawing 
particular attention to the districts of Uthungulu and iLembe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of KwaZulu-Natal    
 
Source: Adapted from DTLGA (2008:1) 
 
The map identifies the areas that were studied, and places them within the geography 
of the province as a whole by identifying some of the main towns and cities in their 
vicinity. The province boasts a subtropical climate with terrain that ranges from lush 
bushveld and savannah to the mountains of the Drakensberg. The coastal regions 
experience summer-rainfall and hot, humid conditions while further inland it is drier, 
with much colder temperatures prevailing in the Drakensberg Mountains where winter 
snow fall is common (Government info, 2008:1).  
 
 
 
 
KwaZulu-Natal is relatively small, representing 7.6% of South Africa’s total land area 
but accounting for 16.7% of the country’s total GDP, making it the second biggest 
contributor (Government info, 2008:1, Mkhize, 2008:1). Around five and a half 
percent of provincial GDP comes directly from agriculture, and KwaZulu-Natal is the 
country’s second largest producer of gross farming income (at a rand value of R8964 
million for the 05/06 period), surpassed only by the Western Cape province. When 
focusing specifically on field crops, which include sugarcane, the province’s gross 
farming income ranks second overall at R1654 million for 2005/2006 (Statssa, 
2008a:1). In addition, KwaZulu-Natal employs the second largest work force within 
the large-scale agricultural sector of 16.6% or over 82 000 paid employees (Statssa, 
2008a:1).  
 
The Sugar Industry Agreement 2000 and the Sugar Act 1978 regulate the industry, 
and all producers of sugarcane and sugar products are bound by this legislation (NDA, 
2008a:34). The province’s extensive sugarcane plantations constitute a major 
component of its agricultural production and close to one percent of the economy’s 
total GDP (Mkhize, 2008:1). In areas such as Tongaat on the north coast, the planting 
of sugarcane can be traced back to 1854 evidencing a long and prominent history of 
this agricultural commodity (KZN, 2008:1). The South African Cane Growers 
Association (SACGA) (established in 1927) administers the country’s sugarcane 
growing industry. The number of national registered growers is approximately 45 300 
who produce in the region of 21 million tons of sugarcane annually (Huletts, 2008:1; 
NDA, 2008a:34). The annual added value attributed directly to South Africa’s 
sugarcane production is R4 billion, while the entire sugar industry has an estimated 
annual direct income of R6 billion (SASA, 2008:1). Although KwaZulu-Natal is a 
large producer (with over 10 million tons per annum), sugarcane is also grown in the 
Eastern Cape and all the way up to the Mpumalanga province (Statssa, 2008b:67).  
About 79% of South Africa’s total crop is produced by large-scale growers, while the 
remainder of production is accounted for by milling companies and small-scale 
farmers (NDA, 2008a:34).   
 
In producing raw or refined sugar, syrup and other by-products, the South African 
sugar industry is one of the most cost competitive in the world (NDA, 2008a:34). 
 
 
Nationally employing, directly and indirectly, an estimated 350 000 individuals, it is a 
major source of income for many South Africans and hence a vital contributor to 
overall economic wellbeing through job creation and its contribution to GDP. Because 
sugarcane represents a key agricultural land usage in Northern KwaZulu-Natal and 
nationally, the case study is focused on land redistribution transactions that have 
occurred in this sector. It is argued that an insight into land redistribution requires an 
understanding of the types of transactions that are taking place and the basic 
procedure through which sales prices are established, both of which are presented in 
the following section.    
 
4.3 Types of land redistribution transactions 
 
The land redistribution transactions in KwaZulu-Natal that were investigated were 
conducted within two programmes, namely Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) and the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS). Both 
these programmes made use of the ‘willing buyer/willing seller’4 framework, but 
differed in the ownership structures created. Firstly, in the LRAD transactions, the 
land was redistributed to new owners, who acquired private property rights to the 
farms (i.e. conditions applicable to a private property regime) (DLA, 2008d). The 
LRAD beneficiaries who wished to use the farms for commercial agriculture 
contributed a minimum amount of capital, and then received the farm as a grant. 
Thus, the purchase price of these farms was not repaid to the government by the 
newly empowered beneficiaries (DLA, 2008d). Secondly, through the PLAS 
programme, the government retained ownership of the farmland (purchased from the 
market), and leased the farms to new proprietors, who paid rent for its use (DLA, 
2008d). Hence, the PLAS programme led to a state property regime. LRAD and 
PLAS deals therefore differed greatly, and those who managed to obtain private 
property rights to their farms for a fraction of the actual purchase price, through 
LRAD, had an advantage over PLAS tenants. The process through which the purchase 
prices of the redistributed farms were determined is discussed below.   
 
                                                 
4 Defined as a market-based approach to land redistribution, which relies on voluntary transactions 
between willing buyers and willing sellers (DLA, 1997:71). “By virtue of the willing-buyer-willing-
seller principle, market value principles are applied when the department acquires land for land reform 
purposes” (MALA, 2006:30). 
 
 
4.4 The land redistribution price determination process 
 
Because land redistribution in South Africa has to take place via the willing 
buyer/willing seller method (Didiza, 2005)5, farmers are not compelled to sell their 
land, and if they wish, they can inform the government that they are not interested in 
selling. For a sale to take place, full agreement must be reached between the 
government (buyer), and the seller. Sellers (comprised of private individuals, small 
companies and large corporations) already in the market would have established an 
asking price ‘equivalent to their perceived’ market value of the land. The relevant 
government departments, however, require valuations to be conducted by independent 
assessors prior to sale6. These farm valuations are then submitted to the Department of 
Land Affairs, and play an important part of the determination of the final price that 
the government (buyer) is willing to pay (DLA, 2008d). All willing buyer/willing 
seller land redistribution deals conducted this way are expected to have taken place at 
market related prices (Didiza, 2005). Trends in the market prices of South Africa’s 
farmland are discussed in coming sections and represent an important starting point in 
assessing whether the land redistribution prices paid by the government have been 
higher than the non-redistributive market prices in KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
4.5 Trends in the market price of South African farmland  
 
The National Department of Agriculture (NDA) publishes the South African Abstract 
of Agricultural Statistics annually. Of particular interest are the price indices of 
farmland sold per province, as they enable the tracking of each province’s general 
farmland price trend. Although these prices are not specific to sugarcane, and include 
various other farming activities, they are an important indicator of how the market has 
progressed over time. Table 4.1 presents the 2008 price trend data from the start of 
South Africa’s land reform programme in 1994, and indicates the average price per 
hectare of all farmland sold per year on an index basis. The provinces are ranked from 
the lowest price per hectare to the highest, using 1994 as the base year.  
 
                                                 
5 Then Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs. 
6 During the research process a minimum of ten different valuers where identified as having assessed at 
least one of the farms incorporated in the case study. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Movements in South African general farmland prices - price (R) paid per 
hectare 
Province 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Limpopo 56.8 57.7 65.6 73.5 81.1 92.2 100.0 96.5 120.1 144.6 170.4 203.7 
North West 66.7 75.2 77.4 79.1 87.9 88.4 100.0 103.8 116.5 171.9 205.0 270.0 
Free State 68.1 76.5 85.1 82.7 89.1 95.4 100.0 97.0 121.6 156.7 190.2 207.1 
Northern 
Cape 
69.4 76.7 78.5 91.8 100.9 95.9 100.0 107.3 141.6 160.7 190.4 214.6 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
73.4 170.1 76.8 93.6 105.1 97.6 100.0 107.5 119.3 117.6 171.3 188.4
Mpumalanga 74.5 78.3 67.8 90.1 113.4 101.5 100.0 101.6 116.4 153.8 143.5 200.4 
Western 
Cape 
79.8 96.4 89.1 106.5 79.9 114.3 100.0 102.2 114.0 143.3 173.0 172.3 
Eastern 
Cape 
83.0 102.8 103.4 116.4 93.5 94.0 100.0 110.5 148.0 169.8 218.1 216.3 
Gauteng 148.1 142.1 250.9 182.1 212.3 188.1 100.0 213.8 269.6 196.6 213.8 461.2 
RSA 83.9 100.5 85.9 93.9 97.6 97.1 100.0 101.2 135.4 162.3 183.5 208.8
* 2000 = Base year 
Source: Adapted from Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (2008:104)  
 
In Table 4.1, it is evident that the price paid per hectare of South Africa farmland has 
increased substantially between 1994 and 2005 in each of the nine provinces, and by 
almost 250 percent, over the same period, when considering the country as a whole. 
The trends in Table 4.1 are presented graphically in Figure 4.2, and illustrate the 
prices of farmland for KwaZulu-Natal and the entire South African market over the 
period 1994-2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Graph of the movements in KwaZulu-Natal and South African general 
farmland prices - price (R) paid per hectare 
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* 2000 = Base year 
Source: Adapted from Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (2008:104)  
 
Figure 4.2, illustrates that apart from a very large increase in 1995 (an outlier) and 
decreases in 1996 and 1999, KwaZulu-Natal displayed an upward trend in farmland 
prices. The period ranging from 2002 to 2005 is of greatest importance7, as it was 
within this period that the majority of the transactions included in the case study took 
place. Table 4.1 shows that 2004 and 2005 were years of major growth in KwaZulu-
Natal’s farmland prices, with the province’s 2004 single period growth being the 
highest of any province. However, when compared with the country as a whole, 
KwaZulu-Natal’s overall price growth remained below average.  
 
4.6 Trends in the market price of KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane farmland  
 
When all other farming activities are excluded and focus is shifted purely to 
sugarcane farmland, the following trends emerge for the districts under study. Table 
4.2 uses an index of the price paid per hectare as a basis to show what market prices 
have been paid for sugarcane farmland for the relevant period.  
                                                 
7 The boom in the price of South Africa’s rural immovable property since 2000 is evident, with general 
prices increasing by over 88 percent. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Price index of KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane farmland market prices based on 
price (R) paid per hectare- Uthungulu and iLembe districts, 2001-2006 
KZN District  2000* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Uthungulu 100 113.8 104.2 116.9 121.4 111.2 111.8
iLembe 100 97.3 118.6 140.7 140.1 108.8 126.3
Average 100 105.6 111.4 128.8 130.7 110.0 119.1
*2000 = Base year 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a)  
 
The data above varies greatly between the two districts, with the iLembe district 
displaying far larger movements in its sugarcane farmland price index, while the 
Uthungulu district’s data looks less volatile. Figure 4.3 uses Table 4.2 data to provide 
graphical trends for the index of market prices of sugarcane farmland in the districts 
of Uthungulu and iLembe, in the same given period.   
 
Figure 4.3 Changes in KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane farmland market prices based on 
price (R) paid per hectare - Uthungulu and iLembe districts 
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In Figure 4.3, it is apparent that prices in the iLembe district illustrate a clear, sharp 
upward movement from 2001 to 2003, followed by a large decline in 20058, and a 
subsequent recovery in prices in 2006. The changes in prices paid per hectare of 
sugarcane are consistent with those paid for all general farmland within KwaZulu-
Natal (Figure 4.2), except for the 2005 year, where the sharp drop in sugarcane farm 
prices was not felt within the general farmland market.  
 
Focusing on the Uthungulu district, results on the market price paid per hectare differ 
somewhat from those in the iLembe district. Apart from a spike in prices in 2001, and 
a corresponding fall in 2002, the Uthungulu district depicts a more gradual upward 
movement, with market prices actually dropping slightly in 2005 and 2006. Compared 
with the price of all general farmland in KwaZulu-Natal (illustrated in Figure 4.2), the 
Uthungulu district’s price growth has been far less exaggerated, and cannot be viewed 
as consistent with that of the province as a whole. 
 
It is generally accepted that when dealing with sugarcane, a more accurate measure of 
land prices is that which considers individual production yields, i.e. price paid per ton 
of yield (Inkezo, 2008). Hence, the following additional table is necessary, as it 
represents prices paid per hectare of yield (tons), based on a four-year average 
production history.  
 
Table 4.3 Price index of KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane farmland market prices based on 
price (R) paid per hectare of yield (tons) - Uthungulu and iLembe districts, 2001-2006 
KZN District  2000* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Uthungulu 100 114.6 98.9 100.3 108.1 106.0 113.9
iLembe 100 99.8 114.9 136.9 133.2 101.4 133.1
Average 100 107.2 106.9 118.6 120.7 103.7 123.5
*2000 = Base year 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a)  
 
In the table, the iLembe district once again shows results that are erratic, while in the 
Uthungulu district a more stable, slow rate of change is evident. Another interesting 
                                                 
8 Possibly because of the fall in the recoverable value per ton of sugarcane from R1357.01 in 
2003/2004, to R1297.19 in 2004/2005.  
 
 
observation when comparing Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 is that the level of farmland 
inflation is consistently higher from 2002 to 2005 when using the price paid per 
hectare data. This suggests that the use of the price paid per hectare of yield data may 
be a more conservative measure of sugarcane farmland price inflation. This is likely 
due to the inclusion of the yield per hectare (tons) produced, instead of simply 
classing all sugarcane farmland as equal and disregarding productivity. A helpful 
graphical representation of Table 4.3 is demonstrated in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4 Changes in KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane farmland market prices based on 
price (R) paid per hectare of yield (tons) – Uthungulu and iLembe districts 
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Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a)  
 
In Figure 4.4, a similar price pattern to Figure 4.3 emerges. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that whether or not production yields are considered when dealing with 
changes in market prices, the results obtained do not vary significantly for the studied 
period. However, due to the price paid per hectare data generally overstating nominal 
annual price increases during the period studied, a more conservative measure of 
sugarcane farmland pricing should account for productivity per hectare (tons).   
 
 
It is further apparent that since 2000, the nominal market price of sugarcane farmland 
has indeed been on the increase in KwaZulu-Natal, in the district of Uthungulu (+ 
13.9%) but specifically within the iLembe district (+ 33.1%), as at the end of 20069.   
 
4.7 Redistribution price data 
 
The following data provides some answers to the question as to whether ‘above’ 
market prices have been paid for sugarcane farmland via the ‘willing buyer/willing 
seller’ process of the land redistribution programme. Hence, the preceding data on 
market prices is compared to the forthcoming redistribution price data.  
 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of all market prices, as discussed in Section 4.6. The 
data was extracted from documented property transfers registered with the sugar 
industry administration board.   
 
Table 4.4 Summary of the average market prices (R) for KwaZulu-Natal sugarcane 
farmland 
Average market prices for sugarcane farmland (R) from 2000-2006 
KZN District Uthungulu iLembe 
  A B A B 
2000 18378 332 15135 283 
2001 20923 381 14729 282 
2002 19149 328 17947 325 
2003 21489 333 21289 387 
2004 22316 359 21210 377 
2005 20431 352 16475 287 
2006 20553 378 19120 376 
  
A = Average market price per hectare (R) 
B = Average market price per hectare of yield (R), based on 4 year average yield 
 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c)  
 
Table 4.4 presents market prices (measured per hectare and per hectare of yield) for 
the two districts and for the period 2000-2006.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Note: the annual increases in farmland prices have not been adjusted for general inflation. 
 
 
4.7.1 Uthungulu district’s land redistribution: private individuals and small 
companies 
 
Table 4.5 presents summarised data on the willing buyer/willing seller transactions 
which have occurred in the Uthungulu district. The full table can be found in 
Appendix A-1.       
 
Table 4.5 Uthungulu- land redistribution transactions of private individuals and small 
companies 
UTHUNGULU DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL COMPANIES 
FARM/ 
CASE 
AUC 
(HA) 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES 
AVERAGE 
TONS 
PRODUCED 
PER HA 
(4YR) 
LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
PRICE PAID PER 
HA OF YIELD (R) 
MARKET 
PRICE PER 
HECTARE 
OF YIELD 
(R) 
PREMIUM (+) 
OR DISCOUNT 
(-) ON 
MARKET 
PRICE (%) 
U 1 108 2003 47 198 333 40.54  -
U 2 105 2004 30 185 359 48.47  -
U 3 123 2004 33 295 359 17.83  -
U 4 98 2004 33 289 359 19.50  -
U 5 220 2004 29 548 359 52.65 +
U 6 59 2006 35 548 378 44.97 +
U 7 145 2006 68 519 378 37.30 +
U 8 52 2006 62 616 378 62.96 +
U 9 170 2006 63 464 378 22.75 +
U 10 127 2006 33 505 378 33.60 +
TOTAL 1207  - 433 4167 3659 127.89 +
AVERAGE 121  - 43 417 366 12.79 +
  
AUC = Area under cane, measured in hectares 
Note: Both the 'Market price per hectare of yield' and the 'Land redistribution price paid per hectare  
         of yield' are based on an average 4yr production history 
        Where an average 4yr production history is used, this includes the yield from the 'year of sale  
        for valuation purposes', and the 3 previous years 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a)      
 
In Table 4.5, of the ten redistribution sales, one took place in 2003, four in 2004 and 
five in 2006, with none being concluded in 2005.  
 
Based on the price paid per hectare of yield, six of the ten transactions took place at 
above market prices. Five occurred in 2006, and one in 2004. Redistribution prices 
 
 
were at first (2003-2004) below those of the market, but at some point in 2004 started 
rising, and overtook market rates. Two possible explanations for this rapid price 
change are, firstly, due to the pool of ‘easy’ sellers for government to buy from 
shrinking very fast. The result being a reduced supply of ‘willing sellers’, meaning 
that the government may have been compelled to offer higher prices to induce sales. 
Secondly, farmers may have realised that the government was in a poor bargaining 
position. Farmers could have used this to their advantage to attain higher prices for 
their farmland. On average, prices paid per farm for land redistribution were 12.79% 
higher than in the ordinary market. On the other hand, when cases U1 and U2 
(outliers on the discount side) are excluded from the calculation, the number increases 
dramatically to a premium paid of 27.11% per farm for the remaining cases. The 
situation is amplified when the 2006 year is considered in isolation, and the average 
premium paid per farm, compared to the market price for the year, increased to a 
massive 40.32%. The large average premium in 2006 makes it clear that the general 
price paid by the government has increased over the researched time period.  
 
Because there is only one buyer of land for redistribution (the government), individual 
farmers have a large degree of bargaining power, and can influence the sales price by 
refusing to sell unless and until the price is high enough. This problem is accentuated 
by the fact that the government identifies specific farms it deems suitable for 
redistribution, meaning that these owners are fully aware of the demand for their land. 
Knowing that the government does not necessarily wish to take its business elsewhere 
the owner may find him/herself in a situation where refusing to sell at a market rate 
will induce the government to offer an above market price. If there were more buyers 
of land there would be greater competition, and the individual farmers would not have 
such a dominant influence on price. This breakdown in the competitive market 
structure, which by definition requires many buyers and sellers, may well provide an 
explanation for the above market prices demanded for sugarcane farmland in the 
Uthungulu district.   
 
It is further evident that prior to 2004 it was not always necessary to pay higher prices 
for land for redistributive purposes. It is possible that the government only began 
paying more for farmland when it realised that the redistribution programme was 
progressing too slowly to meet its own targets on time, and may have offered higher 
 
 
prices to attempt to accelerate the process. No concrete evidence to support this 
proposition has been discovered. However, very few alternative explanations exist for 
the sudden increase in redistribution prices offered. A pattern does emerge, however, 
showing an increased number of transactions per year associated with higher prices, 
possibly due to a greater interest by farmers to sell land when higher prices were 
offered10. This evidence, if confirmed by additional cases, may support the 
proposition that the government is tendering higher prices simply to speed up the land 
reform process. Further support for this view is provided by the fact that since land 
reform started in 1994 not one land redistribution case involving sugarcane land took 
place in the Uthungulu district until the 2002 year, in which one transaction occurred 
but was not included in the current research due to a lack of complete data. Hence, of 
a total of twelve transactions, ranging from 1994 to 2006, five had their roots in the 
2006 year, and all were concluded at above ordinary market rates.  
 
4.7.2 iLembe district’s land redistribution: private individuals and small 
companies 
 
Table 4.6 presents summarised data on land redistribution sales by private individuals 
and small companies in the iLembe district, as well as comparative market price data. 
The full table can be found in Appendix A-2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In support of this, at least two farmers in the study admitted that had it not been for the high prices 
offered by the government, they would not have sold their farms at all. 
 
 
Table 4.6 iLembe- land redistribution transactions of private individuals and small 
companies 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL COMPANIES 
FARM/ 
CASE 
AUC 
(HA) 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES   
AVERAGE 
TONS 
PRODUCED 
PER HA 
(4YR) 
LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
PRICE PAID PER HA 
OF YIELD (R) 
MARKET 
PRICE PER 
HECTARE 
OF YIELD 
(R) 
PREMIUM (+) 
OR DISCOUNT 
(-) ON MARKET 
PRICE (%) 
I 1 200 2002 39 250 325 23.07  -
I 2 150 2004 39 474 377 25.73 +
I 3 79 2004 36 465 377 23.34 +
I 4 1108 2004 51 234 377 37.93  -
I 5 93 2004 13 453 377 20.16 +
I 6 55 2004 47 342 377 9.23  -
I 7 95 2005 22 405 287 41.11 +
I 8 211 2005 42 472 287 64.46 +
I 9 45 2005 29 418 287 45.64 +
I 10 452 2005 39 427 287 48.78 +
TOTAL 2488  - 356 3940 3355 198.99 +
AVERAGE 249  - 36 394 335 19.90 +
  
AUC = Area under cane, measured in hectares 
Note: Both the 'Market price per hectare of yield' and the 'Land redistribution price paid per hectare  
        of yield'  are based on an average 4yr production history 
        Where an average 4yr production history is used, this includes the yield from the 'year of sale   
        for valuation purposes', and the 3 previous years 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a) 
 
Table 4.6 presents results for the iLembe district. Of the ten redistribution sales, one 
took place in 2002, five in 2004 and four in 2005, with none taking place in 2003 or 
2006.  
 
Based on the price paid per hectare of yield, seven of the ten transactions studied were 
concluded at above ordinary market prices. Three of these transactions took place in 
2004 and four in 2005. On average redistribution prices paid per farm in the iLembe 
district were 19.90% higher than non-redistributive market prices. Excluding cases I1 
and I4 (outliers on the discount side), the average premium paid for the remaining 
eight cases increased to 32.52%. Moreover, when considering the 2005 year alone the 
premium per farm is at a remarkable 50.00%. It is thus quite clear that as time has 
progressed, the annual premiums being paid by the government for land redistribution 
 
 
purchases have increased substantially. As in the previous cases (in the Uthungulu 
district), average redistribution prices started below market, then grew rapidly in 2004 
and exceeded non-redistributive market rates. Based on the last four years of data it 
also appears that the upward trend in redistribution price will continue. This trend is 
illustrated by the Uthungulu and iLembe district’s sales by private individuals and 
small companies.   
 
Over the research period, two transactions, which had their roots in the 2002 and 2004 
years, could not be included due to incomplete data. This means that out of a total of 
twelve land redistribution transactions involving sugarcane farmland sold by private 
individuals and small companies which have occurred in the iLembe district since 
1994, at least seven took place at prices substantially (at least 20%) above market 
rates. Of the cases mentioned, four share a ‘year of sale for valuation purposes’ in the 
2005 year.  
 
The high prices are to be expected bearing in mind the government’s high demand for 
farmland, and the farmers’ dominant bargaining power. The nature of such 
transactions meant that the government was in the weaker position, and was at a 
negotiating disadvantage. The government’s goal is to redistribute 30% of South 
Africa’s commercial farmland to the previously disadvantaged by 2014. At December 
2004, a mere 3% had been redistributed since 1994 (Businesstoday, 2007:1). The 
motivation to accelerate the land redistribution process is therefore evident. Farmers, 
acting understandably in the circumstances, used the government’s predicament to 
obtain higher than ordinary compensation for their land.   
 
4.7.3 iLembe district’s land redistribution: large corporation 
 
Table 4.7 presents prices for land redistribution transactions that have been concluded 
in the iLembe district, but in this case, reflect sales made by a large corporation to the 
government. For a full set of data, refer to Appendix A-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 iLembe- land redistribution transactions of a large corporation 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - LARGE CORPORATE DEALS 
FARM/ 
CASE 
AUC 
(HA) 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES  
AVERAGE 
TONS 
PRODUCED 
PER HA (4YR) 
LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
PRICE PAID PER 
HA OF YIELD (R) 
MARKET 
PRICE PER 
HECTARE 
OF YIELD 
(R) 
PREMIUM (+) 
OR 
DISCOUNT (-
) ON 
MARKET 
PRICE (%) 
I 11a 88 2004 47 333 377 11.67 -
I 11b 95 2004 46 352 377 6.63  -
I 11c 105 2004 48 381 377 1.06 +
I 11d 128 2004 46 316 377 16.18  -
I 11e 82 2004 47 401 377 6.37 +
I 12 93 2004 48 343 377 9.02  -
I 13 123 2004 32 411 377 9.02 +
TOTAL 714  - 313 2536 2636 27.05  -
AVERAGE 101  - 45 362 377 3.86  -
  
AUC = Area under cane, measured in hectares 
Note: Both the 'Market price per hectare of yield' and the 'Land redistribution price paid per hectare    
         of yield'  are based on an average 4yr production history 
        Where an average 4yr production history is used, this includes the yield from the 'year of sale  
        for valuation purposes', and the 3 previous years 
        Cases I 11a-e represent one farm, which was split into five sections for sales purposes 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a)  
 
Only one case was made regarding redistribution transactions by a large corporation. 
Between government and that corporation seven farm units were sold as shown in 
Table 4.7. 
 
Using the price paid per hectare of yield only three of the seven transactions took 
place at above market prices. On average, these deals were concluded at a premium of 
a mere 5.48% per farm, and cannot be cited as substantially above the market rate. 
Collectively considering all seven entries, an average discount on the market price of 
3.86% per farm was registered.  
 
The large corporation’s sales thus represent a special case, differing greatly from the 
established trend of paying above market redistribution prices for sugarcane farmland 
in the districts of Uthungulu and iLembe. The conclusion is that not all categories of 
redistribution transactions are taking place at prices higher than the ordinary market 
 
 
rate. The circumstances surrounding the sales by the large corporation, and why these 
transactions may have differed from the individual or small company cases will be 
discussed in chapter five.  
 
The question that the above analyses beg (specifically sales by private individuals and 
small companies) is why not all those who sold their sugarcane farmland, did so to the 
government, if higher prices were possible. The following brief explanations are 
given: 
 
1) Not all the farmers may have been aware of the higher rates being offered by the 
government.   
 
2) In most of the cases studied, the period of each transaction, from evaluation to 
actual hand over, took over one year. Distressed sellers or those wishing to avoid such 
transactions costs may have needed to conclude the sale of their land in a much 
shorter time frame, and as such, the option to sell to the government would not have 
been viable. 
 
3) It is possible that some of the cases used to establish the non-redistributive ordinary 
market price data set were not arms-length, and may have been purposely conducted 
at below market prices. Such cases would have placed downward pressure on the 
established average market rate.     
 
4) Although the data set used to establish the average ordinary market price of 
sugarcane farmland included all transactions registered with the Sugar Industry 
Administration Board, a larger sample may have been necessary. 
 
5) The use of a four-year production history may have covered a period of poor 
performance of certain farms relative to their production potential. The result is that 
these farms may have been undervalued by the study, although the independent farm 
valuers may have seen the farms greater output potential, and valued them 
accordingly.   
 
 
 
 
4.8 Productivity data 
 
The discussion regarding the research question as to whether there was any change in 
the productivity of the farms studied ‘during’ and ‘after takeover’ by the newly 
empowered owners is given in this section. It would be expected that the new owners 
would not be as familiar with the farms as the past proprietors. Without some initial 
guidance with regard to capital expenditure, maintenance of machinery and general 
management, production could be expected to drop on these farms. In realisation of 
this challenge, the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Land Affairs (after some initial 
planning during 2006) established a mentorship programme in the first quarter of 
2007, specifically for LRAD transactions (DLA, 2008c). Fourteen specialist 
agricultural advisors were appointed and the objectives of their work included: 
 
• Carrying out pre-settlement evaluations (benchmark) of the properties 
earmarked for transfer; 
• Producing a business plan which would serve as a budget for the property; and 
• Appointing mentor(s) to oversee the property's operations and check that the 
mentors were performing their duties correctly (DLA, 2008c).  
 
In summary, all aspects of farming operations would be ‘mentored’ and the most 
common cause of failure - poor financial management and control - would be made a 
priority (DLA, 2008c). The KwaZulu-Natal mentorship programme was characterised 
by the following three important attributes, for consideration in the discussion 
chapter: 
 
a) The programme was established in 2007 while the land redistribution programme 
was formulated in 1994,   
b) By October 2008, none of the official agricultural advisors appointed by the 
Department of Land Affairs had received a single assignment,  
c) The PLAS programme does not have a similar mentorship programme in place 
(DLA, 2008d).  
 
 
 
The lack of support programmes such as that of mentorship begs an enquiry into how 
the productivity of the farms included in the case study were affected since transfer of 
ownership. The investigation on the productivity of the two districts is presented in 
the following subsection.  
 
4.8.1 Uthungulu district: private individuals and small companies 
 
Data on the productivity of the sugarcane farms included in the Uthungulu district’s 
land redistribution process are presented in Table 4.8 below. 
 
Table 4.8 Uthungulu’s land redistribution productivity data for sales by private 
individuals and small companies (Tons produced per hectare) 
UTHUNGULU DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRODUCTIVITY DATA 
FARM/ 
CASE 
START 
DATE OF 
NEW 
GROWER 
BEST 
OBSERVED 
LEVEL OF 
OUTPUT 
PER YEAR 
(Tons/Ha) 
PRODUCTION 
DURING 
YEAR OF 
TAKEOVER 
(Tons/Ha) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER  (3 
YRS) 
(Tons/Ha) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
POST 
TAKEOVER 
(YRS VARY) 
(Tons/Ha) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE (+) 
OR 
DECREASE (-) 
IN 
PRODUCTION 
POST 
TAKEOVER 
U 1 2004 52.79 34.39 48.39 15.48 68.01  -
U 2 2004 38.96 12.66 36.32 25.04 31.06  -
U 3 2004 38.84 30.12 34.34 24.34 29.12  -
U 4 2005 61.05 49.20 39.77 55.23 38.87 +
U 5 2004 40.91 17.91 32.76 16.10 50.85  -
U 6 2007 67.01 40.51 33.16  -  -
U 7 2006 89.26 47.11 74.30 58.25 21.60  -
U 8 2007 73.07 35.42 58.46  -  -
U 9 2008 87.54  - 70.32  -  -
U 10 2006 50.32 50.32 27.36 17.40 36.40  -
TOTAL  - 599.75 317.64 455.18 211.84 198.17  -
AVERAGE  - 59.98 35.29 45.52 30.26 28.31  -
Source: Cane Growers (2008c) 
 
The table shows that on average, production decreased by 28.31% after the new 
owners took control of the farms. Only in one (U4) of the seven cases considered did 
productivity increase. Excluding this outlier, production for the remaining six cases 
decreased on average by 39.51% ‘post takeover’. It is also evident that ‘production 
during the year of takeover’ dropped in six of the nine investigated cases, when 
compared to the ‘average production prior to takeover’.  
 
 
4.8.2 iLembe district: private individuals and small companies 
 
Data on the iLembe district’s productivity for the periods before, during and after the 
land redistribution deals were concluded are presented in Table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.9 iLembe’s land redistribution productivity data for sales by private 
individuals and small companies (Tons produced per hectare) 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRODUCTIVITY DATA 
FARM/ 
CASE 
START 
DATE OF 
NEW 
GROWER 
BEST 
OBSERVED 
LEVEL OF 
OUTPUT 
PER YEAR 
(Tons/Ha) 
PRODUCTION 
DURING 
YEAR OF 
TAKEOVER 
(Tons/Ha) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER  (3 
YRS) 
(Tons/Ha) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
POST 
TAKEOVER 
(YRS VARY) 
(Tons/Ha) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE (+) 
OR 
DECREASE (-) 
IN 
PRODUCTION 
POST 
TAKEOVER 
I 1 2002 50.41 43.63 37.25 43.77 17.50 +
I 2 2004 53.16 33.91 40.72 40.36 0.01  -
I 3 2005 65.02 65.02 36.68 56.64 54.42 +
I 4 2004 57.74 52.78 50.39 55.04 9.23 +
I 5 2005 33.13 10.92 13.14 29.05 121.08 +
I 6 2004 62.83 46.46 46.78 48.40 3.46 +
I 7 2006 41.98 5.22 14.96 5.04 66.31  -
I 8 2005 57.51 36.83 43.89 29.12 33.65  -
I 9 2007 38.19 33.47 35.08  -  -
I 10 2005 70.12 33.25 41.02 53.46 30.33 +
TOTAL  - 530.09 361.49 359.91 360.88 136.05 +
AVERAGE  - 53.01 36.15 35.99 40.10 15.11 +
Source: Cane Growers (2008c) 
 
Compared to the Uthungulu district, the table indicates different results for the sales 
by private individuals and small companies in the iLembe district. ‘Post takeover’ 
production increased by an average of 15.11% for the nine cases included. Two cases 
(I7 and I8) displayed substantial decreases in production, of approximately 33% and 
66% respectively. A focus on the ‘production during the year of takeover’ shows 
similar results to the Uthungulu district. Six of the cases for which data were available 
registered noticeably reduced output per hectare, while one case (I6) showed almost 
no change.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.8.3 iLembe district: large corporation 
 
Productivity data for the iLembe district’s land redistribution sales by a large 
corporation is presented in Table 4.10.  
 
Table 4.10 iLembe’s land redistribution productivity data for sales by a large 
corporation (Tons produced per hectare) 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRODUCTIVITY DATA 
FARM/ 
CASE 
START 
DATE OF 
NEW 
GROWER 
BEST 
OBSERVED 
LEVEL OF 
OUTPUT 
PER YEAR 
(Tons/Ha) 
PRODUCTION 
DURING 
YEAR OF 
TAKEOVER 
(Tons/Ha) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER  (3 
YRS) 
(Tons/Ha) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
POST 
TAKEOVER 
(YRS VARY) 
(Tons/Ha) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE (+) 
OR 
DECREASE (-) 
IN 
PRODUCTION 
POST 
TAKEOVER 
I 11a 2004 53.97 53.14 44.49 41.25 7.28  -
I 11b 2004 60.29 50.13 44.49 51.05 14.74 +
I 11c 2004 59.45 56.79 44.49 56.21 26.34 +
I 11d 2004 53.97 50.43 44.49 29.97 32.64  -
I 11e 2004 70.68 56.29 44.49 60.80 36.66 +
I 12 2004 57.68 42.84 49.59 42.98 13.33  -
I 13 2004 49.90 44.16 27.48 48.05 74.85 +
TOTAL  - 405.94 353.78 299.52 330.31 99.34 +
AVERAGE  - 57.99 50.54 42.79 47.19 14.19 +
Source: Cane Growers (2008c) 
 
On average, the seven farms sold by the large corporation displayed increases in 
output per hectare of 14.19% each, thus reflecting similar results to the iLembe 
district’s sales by private individuals and small companies. However, three of the 
farms (I11a, I11d, I12) registered drops in production ‘post takeover’ of 7.28%, 
13.33% and 32.64%. Unlike all previously recorded cases where the majority of farms 
showed a drop in production ‘during the year of takeover’, only one (I12) of the above 
seven farms had a decline in output during that period, depicting an easier transition 
between new and previous owners. As these cases all involved one large corporation, 
no general conclusion can be drawn from the results but they do provide an indication 
that it is possible for productivity to be maintained or even improved after land 
redistribution. A more detailed look at the circumstances surrounding the large 
corporation’s sales, and a probable explanation of why this special case differed from 
the others will be presented in the following chapter.  
 
 
4.9 Conclusion  
 
The recorded data show that the majority of farm sales (by private individuals and 
small companies) for land redistribution purposes took place at prices that are above 
those of non-redistributive market prices. The extent of higher premiums compared to 
non-redistributive market prices increased over the research period, reaching levels of 
40%-50% in the most recent cases. It also seems that the growth in both market and 
redistribution prices as well as the growth of redistribution prices over market prices 
will continue at least for a few more years. This is principally because farmers 
continue to enjoy far greater bargaining power than the government in determining 
prices for farm units identified for redistribution purposes.    
 
Vastly different results can be found in the data from sales by a large corporation, 
where market or below market prices were paid by government. Although there is no 
evidence to suggest that this has set a precedent for other large corporation 
transactions, this special case remains something of an oddity, which cannot readily 
be explained by the available quantitative data, but will be discussed further in the 
following chapter.  
 
Data on the productivity of redistributed farms ‘post takeover’ reflects large 
reductions averaging 39.51% found in all except one of the Uthungulu district’s cases. 
The results for the iLembe district (combining private, small and large corporations) 
were less conclusive. Five of the farm units registered lower output per hectare 
ranging from 7%-66%. However, of a total of twenty-six cases, thirteen portrayed 
reductions in productivity ‘during the year of takeover’. Eleven cases (of twenty-three 
for which data was available) registered reductions in output ‘post transfer’. 
 
The following chapter critically discusses the extent of price differences between the 
ordinary and redistribution land markets in the various districts and by different 
participants. A further discussion and analysis is presented concerning the degree of 
lack of productivity on relevant redistributed farm units, with possible explanations 
given for the reduced performance.    
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
            
 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PRICES 
AND PRODUCTIVITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL’S LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAMME 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The case study of KwaZulu-Natal’s sugarcane farmland sales established that based 
on a price paid per hectare of yield basis11, land redistribution in the Uthungulu and 
iLembe districts has resulted in the majority of transactions involving private 
individuals or small companies taking place at above market rates. It was further 
discovered that the productivity during and after transfer declined in the bulk of those 
deals. This chapter quantifies the extent of redistribution payment over ordinary 
market prices and the under-production on these farms, and discusses why each may 
be occurring.   
 
The main findings of the research presented in this chapter are that ‘above’ market 
prices were recorded on thirteen of the twenty cases involving private individuals and 
small companies amounting to R10.7 million. Given the pressure on government to 
redistribute land timeously, and the advantageous bargaining power afforded to 
sellers, such ‘above’ market payments were to be expected. Government’s total 
annual expenditure on land redistribution within the Uthungulu and iLembe districts 
increased dramatically from 2002 to 2006. This reflects the concerted effort by 
government to accelerate the redistribution process.  
 
In terms of productivity, under-production ‘post takeover’ on eleven of the twenty-
three farms resulted in a loss of over 48 000 tons of sugarcane output, with a forgone 
recoverable value12 of R78 million. The loss of output ‘post takeover’ was attributed 
                                                 
11 Of the two measures established, the price paid per hectare of yield was utilised primarily because 
firstly, it accounted for differing production yields. Secondly, based on findings in chapter fours, it was 
a more conservative measure of sugarcane farmland inflation over the period studied.  
12 Income that would have accrued had the farms maintained their previous average levels of output. 
 
 
to a lack of experience and capacity on the part of the new owners, and the inability of 
government to assist with after sale mentorship.    
 
Section 5.2 begins with an investigation of the data on prices, focusing on each 
district independently, and the degree of over or under market payment that occurred. 
The government’s annual land redistribution expenditure is then examined, and lastly, 
the change in these payments from 2002-2006 is identified. Section 5.3 proposes an 
explanation as to why such high land redistribution prices were paid, followed by a 
discussion of the potential for causality between land redistribution prices, and market 
rates in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, attention is drawn to the data on productivity, and 
the extent of under-production on the farms concerned in each district. Section 5.6 
then explains why productivity may be declining for the periods ‘during’ and ‘post’ 
transfer. Section 5.7 identifies the fundamental problems affecting KwaZulu-Natal’s 
land redistribution policy, and a summary is provided in Section 5.8. The chapter ends 
by highlighting a number of recommendations in Section 5.9, which, if implemented 
may have potential to improve the province’s land redistribution programme.   
 
5.2 Prices 
 
The willing buyer/willing seller land redistribution transactions should, by definition, 
take place at market related prices. The study established a set of non-redistributive 
market prices based on the price paid per hectare of yield, and compared these with 
the redistribution prices paid by the government (buyer). From a total of twenty cases 
involving private individuals and small companies, thirteen did not take place at 
market related prices. The following sub-section estimates the degree of the over or 
under-payment, and identifies the rand value attributed to each.   
 
5.2.1 Uthungulu district: private individuals and small companies 
 
Of the ten cases included for the Uthungulu district, six were concluded at prices 
higher than the non-redistributive market prices. The following table illustrates the 
above market premiums that were paid by the government for the six farms. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 Premiums paid by the government for sugarcane farmland in Uthungulu 
(R,%) 
UTHUNGULU DISTRICT 
FARM/ 
CASE 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES 
TOTAL MARKET 
VALUE OF 
EACH FARM (R) 
TOTAL PAID BY 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
PER FARM (R) 
TOTAL VALUE OF 
GOVERNMENT’S OVER-
PAYMENT (R and %) 
U 5 2004 2 290 420 3 496 240 1 205 820 (52.7) 
U 6 2006 780 570 1 131 620 351 050 (44.9) 
U 7 2006 3 727 080 5 117 340 1 390 260 (37.3) 
U 8 2006 1 218 672 1 985 984 767 312 (62.9) 
U 9 2006 4 048 380 4 969 440 921 060 (22.8) 
U 10 2006 1 584 198 2 116 455 532 257 (33.6) 
TOTAL  - 13 649 320 18 817 079 5 167 759 (37.9) 
AVERAGE  - 2 274 887 3 136 180 861 293 (37.9) 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a)      
 
In Table 5.113 it is evident that, viewed in terms of a rand value the five transactions 
in 2006 cost the government almost an additional R4 million (sum of the over-
payment for cases U6-U10) when contrasted with the ordinary market rate of about 
R11.36 million (sum of the market value for cases U6-U10), corresponding to an 
over-payment of 34.9%. Although this may not seem like much since the transactions 
took place over the entire year of 2006, they nonetheless resulted from the 
redistribution of a mere 553 hectares of farmland. Bearing in mind that South Africa 
aims to redistribute a total of about 30 million hectares of farmland, if the over-
payment occurring in KwaZulu-Natal were to be projected throughout the country, the 
total excess expenditure could be enormous (in the hundreds of billions of rand). The 
over-payment for case U5 in 2004 was just over R1.2 million, which brings the total 
for the six cases in the Uthungulu district to almost R5.2 million (37.9%).     
 
5.2.2 iLembe district: private individuals and small companies 
 
From a total of ten cases involving private individuals and small companies in the 
iLembe district, seven took place at prices which were higher than the non-
                                                 
13 Table 5.1’s calculations can be verified by using Table 4.5 in Section 4.7.1. 
 
 
redistributive market rate. The government paid the following above market 
premiums for the seven farms, illustrated in Table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2 Premiums paid by the government for sugarcane farmland in iLembe (R,%) 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
FARM/ 
CASE 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES 
TOTAL MARKET 
VALUE OF 
EACH FARM (R) 
TOTAL PAID BY 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
PER FARM (R) 
TOTAL VALUE OF 
GOVERNMENT’S OVER-
PAYMENT (R and %) 
I 2 2004 2 205 450 2 772 900 567 450 (25.7)  
I 3 2004 1 072 188 1 322 460 250 272 (23.3) 
I 5 2004 455 793 547 677 91 884 (20.2) 
I 7 2005 599 830 846 450 246 620 (41.1) 
I 8 2005 2 543 394 4 182 864 1 639 470 (64.5) 
I 9 2005 374 535 545 490 170 955 (45.7) 
I 10 2005 5 059 236 7 52 7156 2 467 920 (48.8) 
TOTAL  - 12 310 426 17 744 997 5 434 571 (44.2) 
AVERAGE  - 1 758 632 2 535 000 776 367 (44.2) 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a)      
 
Table 5.214, illustrates that by taking the total redistribution payments made by the 
government (buyer) for farmland and subtracting these from the market value of the 
land, that for the four farms purchased in 2005 (I7, I8, I9, I10) an additional payment 
of approximately R4.5 million or 52.8% was made (R13.10 million – R8.58 million). 
By including all seven of the cases where a premium was paid, the total difference 
between redistribution and market prices for the period 2002 to 2006 rises to over 
R5.4 million or 44.2% (R17.74 million – R12.31 million) for the iLembe district. 
Such payment above the ordinary market price, which accounted for the transfer of 
1125 hectares of sugarcane farmland, illustrates the inability of the government to 
transact within an acceptable ‘willing buyer/willing seller framework’ at market rates. 
Moreover, it may characterise deals where unwilling sellers (or farmers) who were 
not in the sales market, were persuaded to become sellers due to the handsome profits 
they stood to gain by dealing with the government. In support of this proposition, at 
                                                 
14 Table 5.2’s calculations can be verified by using Table 4.6 in Section 4.7.2. 
 
 
least two farmers15 in the survey admitted that had it not been for the high prices 
offered, they would not have undertaken to sell to the government.    
 
5.2.3 iLembe district: large corporation 
 
Results of the large corporate sales in the iLembe district differ somewhat from the 
cases discussed already, as indicated in the following table. 
 
Table 5.3 Prices paid by the government for sugarcane farmland in iLembe (R,%)   
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
FARM/ 
CASE 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES 
TOTAL MARKET 
VALUE OF 
EACH FARM (R) 
TOTAL PAID BY 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
PER FARM (R) 
TOTAL VALUE OF 
GOVERNMENT’S OVER 
(+) OR UNDER (-) 
PAYMENT (R) 
I 11a 2004 1 559 272 1 377 288 181 984  - (11.7) 
I 11b 2004 1 647 490 1 538 240 109 250  - (06.6) 
I 11c 2004 1 900 080 1 920 240 20 160 + (01.1) 
I 11d 2004 2 219 776 1 860 608 359 168  - (16.2) 
I 11e 2004 1 452 958 1 545 454 92 496 + (06.4) 
I 12 2004 1 682 928 1 531 152 151 776  - (09.0) 
I 13 2004 1 483 872 1 617 696 133 824 + (09.0) 
TOTAL  - 11 946 376 11 390 678 555 698  - (03.9) 
AVERAGE  - 1 706 625 1 627 240 79 385  - (03.9) 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a)      
 
As illustrated in Table 5.316, seven farms were included, of which three (I11c, I11e, 
I13) were sold at premiums (on a per hectare of yield basis) ranging from only 1%-
9% (average = 5.5%). Bearing in mind the method of calculating averages, over-
payments of this size (5%-10%) obviously do not represent large deviations from the 
average market prices, and were equivalent to a few of the cases used in the average 
market price calculation. Further considering that the average premiums for the two 
previous scenarios were 37.9% and 44.2% respectively, the classification of the 
current cases as market related is justified. The fact that these transactions took place 
at prices so similar to the market rate is however odd given the unequal bargaining 
                                                 
15 Previous owners of farms U7 and U8, which were sold at premiums of 37.3% & 62.96% 
respectively. 
16 Table 5.3’s calculations can be verified by using Table 4.7 in Section 4.7.3. 
 
 
power of the two parties. The four remaining farms from the iLembe district were 
purchased by the government at discounts to the market price (6.6%, 9.0%, 11.7%, 
16.2%), resulting in the average for all seven cases being at a discount of 3.86% to 
market prices.   
By converting the 3.9% discount to a rand value, Table 5.3 shows that a total of over 
R550 000 was saved by the government on the seven transactions. The large 
corporation’s sales therefore remain an oddity, and do not follow the established norm 
of paying higher premiums for redistribution purposes. Huletts (2008:1) states “With 
the growth of economic development and empowerment of previously disadvantaged 
people, a growing number of medium-scale farmers are continuing to enter sugarcane 
agriculture on farms made available at market-related prices by the major milling 
companies”. This statement may provide evidence of how and why the large 
corporation’s transactions differed so greatly from the cases of individuals and small 
companies. Bearing in mind that large corporations such as that in question may 
consider they have social responsibilities to fulfil (e.g. empowerment of the 
previously disadvantaged), and a public image to protect, the sales at market-based 
prices may have been thus motivated. Further, as the large corporation was directly 
involved in the sugar industry it was within their interests to establish a good 
relationship with the new owners of farms, as well as with the government. Therefore, 
the company may have given up the short-term profits from farm sales at higher 
prices, for the long-term gain of being able to assist the new farmers, and ensure 
consistently high outputs in years to come. High outputs would mean a more reliable 
supply of sugarcane essential to the success of the large corporation because of its 
direct association with the farm industry. In addition, unlike all other cases, the large 
corporate deals were not once off transactions, as the company in fact undertook 
seven separate sales with government. This discussion provides some justification for 
the vastly differing prices paid, as the longer-term relationship between the affected 
parties was clearly very different to that of the government with the once off private 
individual and small company sellers, who had no need to be involved in their 
discarded farms’ future wellbeing. It must however be stated categorically that this 
special case cannot be fully explained by the information available.   
 
 
 
5.2.4 Government’s total annual land redistribution expenditure 
 
For the districts studied, the government accumulated escalating annual costs in 
acquiring farmland for redistribution. Figure 5.1 illustrates government’s total annual 
land redistribution expenditure in the Uthungulu district from 2001-2006. 
 
Figure 5.1 Government’s estimated total annual land redistribution expenditure (R) – 
Uthungulu district 
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Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a); DLA (2008a)      
 
Figure 5.1 shows that in the Uthungulu district for 200317, approximately R997 000 
was spent in purchasing sugarcane farmland from private individuals and small 
companies for the purposes of redistribution. In 2004 this expenditure increased by 
625.28% to R6 234 000, and for 2006, a total of about R15 310 000 was paid by the 
government in the Uthungulu district. Total land redistribution payments by the 
government therefore show a clear upward movement, rising very quickly from less 
than R1 million to over R15 million over four years. The annual increases appear to 
confirm the theory that a concerted effort was made to speed up the redistribution 
process, especially in the district of Uthungulu.  
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates governments total annual land redistribution expenditure in the 
iLembe district from 2001-2005 (no expenditure was incurred in 2006).  
                                                 
17 ‘Year of sale for valuation purposes’. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Government’s estimated total annual land redistribution expenditure (R) – 
iLembe district 
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Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a); DLA (2008a)      
 
Making use of Figure 5.2, which illustrates the iLembe district’s combined private, 
small and large corporation sales, it was found that in the 2002 ‘year of sale for 
valuation purposes’, R1 940 000 was spent. During 2004 expenditure rose by 
1551.55% to about R30 100 000 (primarily due to the large number of transactions 
concluded in 2004), and in 2005 a total of almost R13 123 000 was paid by the 
government to purchase sugarcane farmland for redistribution purposes18. The upward 
movement in total annual costs however remains evident, and although government 
expenditure was very low in 2002, it soared in 2004 (due to the increased number of 
deals), and slowed somewhat in 2005. As found in the Uthungulu district case, it is 
clear that for total annual expenditure to increase so dramatically in the iLembe 
district over a period of only four years, the government must have actively promoted 
redistribution transactions to meet political targets. In support of this, it must be noted 
that the media placed continued pressure on the government to drive the land 
redistribution process at a faster rate and to meet its targets on time (e.g. Bernstein, 
2008:1). The increased annual expenditure recorded has been in response to 
comments such as:  
 
                                                 
18 The costs described do not include the three additional cases that could not be used in the case study 
due to a lack of complete data, one of which occurred in 2002 and two in 2004. 
 
 
“Land redistribution is taking place far too slowly to meet government’s target that 
30% of commercial agricultural land should be owned by blacks by 2014. In the three 
years to 2007, state redistribution of formerly white-owned land to black owners 
increased by less than 0.5%, from 4.3% of commercial land to 4.7%” (Bernstein, 
2008:1). With such close attention being paid to the results of South Africa’s land 
reform process, the government has been pressed to hasten the rate of redistribution.    
 
5.3 Why higher prices are possible 
 
At least two explanations are available for the high redistribution prices that the 
government has paid private individuals and small companies for their sugarcane 
farmland to promote the land redistribution programme. Firstly, the government is the 
only buyer of land for the purposes of redistribution in South Africa. Such a situation 
would generally be referred to as a monopsony, and should theoretically give the 
government the majority of the market power, allowing it to determine the price of the 
farmland purchased. However, this does not mean that there is only one buyer of land 
in general, as market transactions that do not involve the government obviously do 
take place. The result being that the government has tried to create a monopsony 
within a competitive market, meaning that all the market power associated with a 
monopsonistic market structure has fallen away. The government being the only 
redistributive buyer however denotes that in most cases, it does not seek wide options, 
and targets specific farms it deems suitable for redistribution. Knowing that the 
potential buyer does not want to take business elsewhere, and that the government is 
in a race to redistribute 30% of the country’s commercial land by 2014, the farm 
owners are left with a degree of power as to the selling price. Based on this 
explanation the prices paid by the government can be expected to be above market, as 
it lacked bargaining power and demonstrated none of the characteristics of a 
monopsony; the proceeds of sales by private individuals and small companies reflect 
this circumstance.  
 
Secondly, farmers are not forced to sell their land, and if they wish to do so, can tell 
the government that they are not interested in selling. This combined with the fact that 
land redistribution is progressing at a very slow rate (4.7% of commercial land 
redistributed by the end of 2007), may well be prompting the government not to 
 
 
challenge the farmers higher asking prices in an attempt to speed up the purchasing 
process, and conclude an accelerated number of deals (DLA, 2007a:1; Businesstoday, 
2007:1). The findings in the Uthungulu and iLembe districts discussed below support 
this latter proposition.  
 
To begin with, of the six transactions involving private individuals and small 
companies that took place at above market rates in the Uthungulu district from 1994-
2006, five had a ‘year of sale for valuation purposes’ in 2006. Over a period of four 
years (2003-2006), the average prices per hectare of yield paid by the government 
grew from being 40% below to 40% above the market price. The weighted average 
prices it paid increased by over 85% during the 2003/2004 period and by another 36% 
in 2005/2006 (see Table 4.5). These figures indicate a rapid upward movement in the 
prices that the government was prepared to pay for sugarcane farmland in the 
Uthungulu district over a relatively short period (4 years).   
 
Furthermore, with respect to sales by private individuals and small companies in the 
iLembe district, of the seven above market deals ranging from 1994-2005, four took 
place in 2005. The government paid prices per hectare of yield from as little as 23% 
below the market in 2002 to an average premium of 50% above the market price for 
the 2005 year. The weighted average prices paid by the government grew by 25% 
during 2003/2004, and a further 40% in 2004/2005 (see Table 4.6). The iLembe 
district’s results are thus commensurate with those of Uthungulu, depicting 
noticeable, sharp annual increases in the prices tendered by the government for 
sugarcane farmland. It is doubtful whether such large increases in the prices paid per 
hectare of yield by the government could have occurred without their realisation, yet 
they continued to conclude transactions at above market rates.     
 
The above discussion illustrates how the farmer’s greater bargaining power allowed 
them to transact with the government at above market prices, and demanded even 
higher payment for their land over the years.  As shown, the result has been a gradual 
increase in the number of land redistribution transactions taking place, but at the cost 
of a far larger capital investment in comparison to the market.  
 
 
 
 
5.4 Causality between land redistribution prices and market prices  
 
The link between normal market and redistribution prices is central to the explanation 
for the above market rates offered by the government for sugarcane farmland. If an 
even loosely regulated relationship between these two prices could be ascertained it 
would greatly assist government buyers to resolve the current above market payment 
problems by allowing them to cite a compromise procedure. For example if the higher 
redistribution prices were causing a rise in general market prices, the government 
would be obliged to pay higher rates for sugarcane farmland in perpetuity, because 
farmers expectations would not decline. Without some form of regulation, the prices 
could spiral out of control.    
 
In respect of the redistribution case, causality may be present, i.e. the higher land 
redistribution prices may well have impacted on the market prices of sugarcane 
farmland, or vice versa. For example in the Uthungulu district during the 2006 year, 
the market price per hectare of yield was approximately R378 per ton. However, the 
five land redistribution deals that took place in 2006 were concluded at an average of 
R530.4 per hectare of yield (tons), some 40% above the market rate. Other farmers in 
the area becoming aware of the prices that the government was prepared to pay for 
sugarcane farmland, may well have upped their asking prices, and in this way 
increased the market price by concluding non-redistribution sales at higher prices.  
 
Alternatively, in the iLembe district for example, the government may have noted that 
market prices had been steadily increasing since 2000 from R283 per ton to R377 per 
ton of yield in 2004, and anticipated further increases in 2005. In order to remain 
competitive the government may have offered higher redistribution prices based on 
their perceptions of the market, demonstrating causality opposite to that described in 
the first example.  
 
Given the lack of available data, however, causality in neither of the two directions 
can be ascertained. Shifting focus to correlation analysis, perhaps it could be of 
greater assistance in determining if a relationship exists between redistribution prices 
and market rates. However, as in the case of causality, the lack of complete (about 30 
observations) time series data negates any such quantitative or qualitative econometric 
 
 
analysis. The relationship between redistribution and market prices is an important 
possible explanation for the higher prices paid by the government for sugarcane 
farmland, which cannot, however, be fully addressed in this discussion.   
 
5.5 Productivity  
 
The case study also investigated the average productivity on the farms discussed in 
the previous section, transferred through the land redistribution process. Attention was 
drawn to three periods, namely,  
a) Before farm takeover  
b) During the year of transfer  
c) After the year of transfer  
 
In every case, a ‘best observed level of output’ over the period 1999-2007 was also 
recorded, depicting the probable production potential of each farm (see Table 4.8, 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10).  
 
5.5.1 Uthungulu district: private individuals and small companies 
 
Table 5.4 depicts the Uthungulu district’s productivity data for sales by private 
individuals and small companies, adjusted from Table 4.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Uthungulu’s productivity data for sales by private individuals and small 
companies (Tons/Ha; %) 
FARM/ 
CASE 
BEST 
OBSERVED 
LEVEL OF 
OUTPUT 
PER YEAR 
(Tons/Ha, Yr 
of best level)  
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER   
(3 YRS) 
(Tons/Ha) 
OUTPUT 
WITHIN 5 
TONS PER 
HECTARE 
BELOW 
BEST 
LEVELS 
(PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE(+) 
OR 
DECREASE(-) 
IN OUTPUT 
'DURING YEAR 
OF TAKEOVER' 
(%) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE(+) 
OR 
DECREASE(-) 
IN OUTPUT 
'POST 
TAKEOVER' 
(%) 
OUTPUT 
WITHIN 5 
TONS PER 
HECTARE 
BELOW 
BEST 
LEVELS 
(POST 
TAKEOVER) 
U 1 52.79 (2003) 48.39 YES 28.93  - 68.01 - NO
U 2 38.96 (2000) 36.32 YES 65.14  - 31.06 - NO
U 3 38.84 (2000) 34.34 YES 12.29  - 29.12 - NO
U 4 61.05 (2004) 39.77 NO 23.71 + 38.87 + NO
U 5 40.91 (2002) 32.76 NO 45.33  - 50.85 - NO
U 6 67.01 (2000) 33.16 NO 22.17 +  -  -
U 7 89.26 (2000) 74.30 NO 36.59  - 21.60 - NO
U 8 73.07 (1999) 58.46 NO 39.41  -  -  -
U 9 87.54 (2001) 70.32 NO  -  -  -
U 10 50.32 (2006) 27.36 NO 83.92 + 36.40 - NO
TOTAL 599.75 455.18  - 97.91  - 198.17 -  -
AVERAGE 59.98 45.52  - 10.88  - 28.31 -  -
Source: Cane Growers (2008c) 
 
Table 5.4 illustrates that in the Uthungulu district, ‘during the year of takeover19’, 
production fell in six of the nine cases for which data were available. For these six 
cases, an average drop in output of 37.95% was recorded compared to the ‘average 
production prior to takeover’. The results represent a less than satisfactory transition 
between old and new owners in terms of productivity.  
 
Production declined ‘post takeover’ in six of the seven available cases included in the 
Uthungulu district’s data set by an average of 39.51%. Compared to the average 
production ‘prior to takeover’, a loss of output of just over 32 700 tons occurred ‘post 
takeover’ for the six cases in question from 2005-2007. Using the published 
recoverable value (RV) per ton of sugarcane and average production data for the 
farms before and after takeover, a rand value was calculated for the loss of income 
attributed to the decline in output from 2005-2007, amounting to approximately R52 
642 000. This amount represented a collective reduction in average annual income of 
approximately 44% for the six farms.  
 
                                                 
19 Note: Technology is assumed to remain constant before and after takeover in all cases.  
 
 
The ‘best observed level of output’ gives some indication of the potential optimal 
production on each farm, representing as it does the largest output per hectare that the 
farms managed to produce between 1999 and 2007. From that level, it was possible to 
ascertain that for the three years ‘prior to takeover’, only three (U1, U2, U3) of the 
farms sold for redistribution in the Uthungulu district were operating at close to20 their 
maximum recorded output. After transfer however, none of the seven farms produced 
within five tons per hectare below their highest historical levels, and overall average 
output fell by 33.52%. Although output did increase in one of the cases (U4) by 
38.87%, the number of farms optimising productivity fell from three (U1, U2, U3) to 
none ‘post takeover’. From this data, the research question of whether productivity 
fell post transfer is answered. As mentioned already, output fell by 33.52% on 
average. Without any after sales mentorship from the government or previous owners, 
the disappointing transition between proprietors and the poor productivity results post 
transfer illustrated in the Uthungulu district may have been expected.      
 
5.5.2 iLembe district: private individuals and small companies 
 
Table 5.5 illustrates the iLembe district’s productivity data for sales by private 
individuals and small companies, adjusted from Table 4.9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Within five tons per hectare 
 
 
Table 5.5 iLembe’s productivity data for sales by private individuals and small 
companies (Tons/Ha; %) 
Source: Cane Growers (2008c) 
 
Table 5.5 depicts that in the iLembe district, ‘during the year of takeover’, sugarcane 
production declined in six of the ten cases21. The average drop in output for these six 
cases when compared to the average production prior to takeover was 23.06%, 
illustrating a poor transition between current and previous owners in the majority of 
cases. These results are similar to those from the Uthungulu district, as output also fell 
in six of its cases ‘during the year of takeover’ by an average of 37.95%.      
 
‘Post takeover’, sugarcane production fell by an average of 49.98% in two (I7 and I8) 
of the iLembe district’s nine cases for which data were available. The two farms 
recorded a total combined loss of about 7175 tons of output from 2006-2007 
compared to an ‘average production prior to takeover’ of approximately 10680 tons 
per annum. Calculating recoverable value, these farms the total ‘area of which under 
cane’ was 306 hectares, forfeited over R12 200 000 worth of income due to reduced 
output, which was equivalent to a reduction in actual annual income of approximately 
35%. On the remaining seven farms, production actually increased by an average of 
                                                 
21 Note: Case I6’s production was classified as unchanged, as it declined by less than one percent.   
FARM/ 
CASE 
BEST 
OBSERVED 
LEVEL OF 
OUTPUT 
PER YEAR 
(Tons/Ha,  Yr 
of best level) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER   
(3 YRS) 
(Tons/Ha) 
OUTPUT 
WITHIN 5 
TONS PER 
HECTARE 
BELOW 
BEST 
LEVELS 
(PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE(+) 
OR 
DECREASE(-) 
IN OUTPUT 
'DURING 
YEAR OF 
TAKEOVER' 
(%) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE(+) 
OR 
DECREASE(-) 
IN OUTPUT 
'POST 
TAKEOVER' 
(%) 
OUTPUT 
WITHIN 5 
TONS PER 
HECTARE 
BELOW 
BEST 
LEVELS 
(POST 
TAKEOVER) 
I 1 50.41 (2007) 37.25 NO 17.13 + 17.50 + NO
I 2 53.16 (2000) 40.72 NO 16.72  - 0.01 - NO
I 3 65.02 (2005) 36.68 NO 77.26 + 54.42 + NO
I 4 57.74 (2000) 50.39 NO 4.74 + 9.23 + YES
I 5 33.13 (2007) 13.14 NO 16.89  - 121.08 + YES
I 6 62.83 (2000) 46.78 NO 0.68  - 3.46 + NO
I 7 41.98 (2002) 14.96 NO 65.11  - 66.31 - NO
I 8 57.51 (2000) 43.89 NO 16.09  - 33.65 - NO
I 9 38.19 (2006) 35.08 YES 4.59  -  -  -
I 10 70.12 (2000) 41.02 NO 18.94  - 30.33 + NO
TOTAL 530.09 359.91  - 39.89  - 136.05 +  -
AVERAGE 53.01 35.99 - 3.99  - 15.11 + -
 
 
33.72% ‘post takeover’, in vast contrast to the Uthungulu district, where output 
increased in only one of its cases (U4) by 38.87% during the same period.   
 
‘Prior to takeover’, only one of the ten farms (I9) was producing close to (within five 
tons per hectare below) its optimal output, but this number increased to two out of 
nine farms (I4 and I5) after transfer took place (post transfer production data for case 
I9 was not available). The number of sugarcane farms realising productive capacity 
therefore increased slightly in the iLembe district as a result of the land redistribution 
transfers involving private individuals and small companies. No firm explanation for 
the large difference in production results ‘post takeover’ between the districts of 
iLembe and Uthungulu was discovered. One possibility may be that the ‘new’ owners 
had limited cash resources available for the purchase of direct inputs, or were more 
‘risk averse’ than previous owners.  
 
5.5.3 iLembe district: large corporation 
 
Table 5.6 depicts the iLembe district’s productivity data for sales by a large 
corporation, adjusted from Table 4.10.  
 
Table 5.6 iLembe’s productivity data for sales by a large corporation (Tons/Ha; %) 
FARM/ 
CASE 
BEST 
OBSERVED 
LEVEL OF 
OUTPUT PER 
YEAR 
(Tons/Ha, Yr 
of best level) 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER    
(3 YRS) 
(Tons/Ha) 
OUTPUT 
WITHIN 5 
TONS PER 
HECTARE 
BELOW 
BEST 
LEVELS 
(PRIOR TO 
TAKEOVER) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE(+) 
OR 
DECREASE(-) 
IN OUTPUT 
'DURING 
YEAR OF 
TAKEOVER' 
(%) 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE(+) 
OR 
DECREASE(-) 
IN OUTPUT 
'POST 
TAKEOVER' 
(%) 
OUTPUT 
WITHIN 5 
TONS PER 
HECTARE 
BELOW 
BEST 
LEVELS 
(POST 
TAKEOVER) 
I 11a 53.97 (2002) 44.49 NO 19.44 + 7.28 - NO
I 11b 60.29 (2006) 44.49 NO 12.68 + 14.74 + NO
I 11c 59.45 (2006) 44.49 NO 27.65 + 26.34 + YES
I 11d 53.97 (2002) 44.49 NO 13.35 + 32.64 - NO
I 11e 70.68 (2006) 44.49 NO 26.52 + 36.66 + NO
I 12 57.68 (2002) 49.59 NO 13.61  - 13.33 - NO
I 13 49.90 (1999) 27.48 NO 60.70 + 74.85 + YES
TOTAL 405.94 299.52  - 146.73 + 99.34 +  -
AVERAGE 57.99 42.79  - 20.96 + 14.19 +  -
Source: Cane Growers (2008c) 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 focuses on the transactions in the iLembe district involving a large 
corporation, and illustrates that reductions in output ‘post takeover’ took place in 
three of the seven cases (I11a, I11d, I12) by an average of 17.75%. Compared to the 
average output prior to takeover, output on the three farms decreased by over 8200 
tons from 2005-2007, amounting to a loss of R13 215 000 worth of potential 
recoverable income, which corresponded to an actual reduction in their collective 
income of about 20% per annum.  
 
‘During the year of takeover’, output fell in only one of the seven cases (I12) by 
13.61% compared with ‘production prior to takeover’. It seems the transition between 
the previous and new owners was far better in cases involving the large corporation 
than in all other transactions discussed so far. An independent authority22 on the 
iLembe district’s sugarcane farms attributed the ability of new owners to maintain 
competitive outputs to their general farming attitude, the high quality of the farms in 
question and some minor financial and informational support from the large corporate 
involved. As previously noted the large corporation was directly involved in the sugar 
industry, and it was thus in their best interests to assist new owners, and ensure that 
they produced consistently high outputs.  These high outputs would have resulted in 
the maintenance of supply, allowing the large corporation to forecast and continue to 
generate long-term revenue. This explanation also serves to understand why the 
company was willing to forego the short-term profits, which could have been secured 
by selling holdings to the government at inflated prices.  
 
Using the ‘highest observed levels of output’ as a reference, it is evident that prior to 
transfer none of the seven farms was producing within five tons per hectare below 
their optimum levels. ‘Post takeover’ total output per hectare increased sufficiently for 
two (I11c and I13) of the seven farms to attain levels of output within five tons per 
hectare below their highest observed levels. It seems that land redistribution transfers 
from the large corporation in the iLembe district had a small, but positive impact on 
the productivity of its sugarcane farms, specifically during the takeover period. The 
large corporation’s cases thus provide the best overall production results (considering 
                                                 
22 From a private company working in conjunction with the government on the iLembe district’s land 
redistribution programme.   
 
 
both ‘during’ and ‘post’ transfer) researched, and for that reason remain a special 
case.  
 
It is apparent that the relationship between the large corporation, the new owners and 
the government was very different to any of the private individuals and small 
companies. The basic23 mentorship provided by the large corporation and the longer-
term repeated sales with the government highlight the differing characteristics 
between the large corporation’s deals and those of other sellers. The assistance 
offered may well have resulted in the superior outputs produced on the seven farms, 
and the smooth transition between new and old proprietors. The effectiveness of a 
good relationship between owners combined with a degree of mentorship is therefore 
evident, providing justification for a formal government mentorship programme to be 
implemented for all other redistribution sales.    
 
5.5.4 Brief summary of the results on productivity 
 
Although the results for the iLembe district are far more encouraging than those of 
Uthungulu, nevertheless in eleven of the twenty-three cases studied, production per 
hectare decreased by an average of 35.48% per farm ‘post takeover’. Of the remaining 
cases, one showed almost no change in yield, while the other eleven farms produced 
greater outputs per hectare. ‘During the year of takeover’, thirteen of the twenty-six 
farms included registered declines in output per hectare averaging 29.20%, whilst one 
farm remained almost unchanged, and twelve showed increased output. With 
production figures readily available to them, the Departments of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs must be aware of the decreases in output in a number of farms within the 
districts of Uthungulu and iLembe. Large corporate sales in the iLembe district 
recorded the best overall production results, which were attributed to their farming 
attitude, the high quality of the farms and basic mentorship from the large corporate 
concerned. A provincial mentorship programme could thus be a critical positive 
development in correcting the potential productivity dilemma but for reasons 
unknown has not been properly implemented.    
 
                                                 
23 Basic financial and informational assistance, as opposed to an all-encompassing, formal mentorship 
programme.  
 
 
Collectively, underperformance ‘post takeover’ on the eleven farms meant a loss of 
over R78 million, which represents substantial forfeited income and potential GDP, 
particularly taking into consideration that it was the result of poor production on only 
1443 hectares of farmland. ‘Post takeover’ only four of the twenty-three farms studied 
were producing within five tons per hectare below their historical highs, illustrating 
that there is scope for large-scale productive improvement. If KwaZulu-Natal’s sugar 
industry is to remain efficient and competitive, there is a need for immediate 
managerial assistance to the farms in question.  Such assistance must also be extended 
to any future sugarcane farmland (owners/tenants) transferred under the land 
redistribution process.  
 
5.6 Why productivity has declined  
 
When compared with output prior to transfer, half of the farms studied showed 
reduced productivity ‘during the year of takeover’. As mentioned, the years in 
question represent those in which ownership and management changed hands, and 
thus total output during this period was partially attributable to each of the parties 
concerned (being old and new owners). The decline in output could therefore be 
potentially attributed to either of these parties, or the process itself.  
 
Firstly, the ‘old owners’ would have known for some time24 that their farms were to 
be transferred, and that payment for the land was pending, but legally guaranteed. If 
this transfer of ownership were to take place before the cutting season (i.e. before 
sugarcane is brought to market for receipt of payments), these farmers would have 
had little incentive to maximise output, as any additional profits from their work 
would not have accrued to them. Furthermore, the purchase price for the farmland 
would have already been established, and would thus be unaffected by the farm’s last 
few months of productivity. The lack of incentive to retain high output levels (for 
those whose transfer took place before the cutting season) may well have caused a 
number of farmers to neglect their sugarcane crops and leave the repercussions to be 
dealt with by the unsuspecting ‘new owners’. If however, the time of transfer 
coincided with the cutting season, when financial consideration was received, it 
                                                 
24 Average 8-10 months. 
 
 
would have been within the interests of the old owners to maintain consistent 
standards, as they would still have received full benefit for their work. If the 
government had understood that fact, and waited to transfer farms in abundance 
during or towards the end of the cutting season, it would have dramatically increased 
the chances of the new owners moving onto farms that were operating efficiently. 
This would further have improved the probability of the new owners succeeding, as 
they could have picked up where the previous owners left off, instead of starting at a 
disadvantage and having to correct weeks or months of earlier poor farming practice.    
 
Secondly, it can logically be expected that a period of transition would occur, while 
the new owners familiarised themselves with the farms facilities and day-to-day 
activities. Productivity may have understandably suffered during this period of 
adjustment. Their degree of experience of sugarcane farming would also have affected 
the time it took for the new owners to get through this initial uncertain phase. 
Additionally, output could have been adversely affected if lack of experience on the 
part of new owners coupled with the onset of the cutting season coincided with the 
transfer process. Thus, the decline in productivity experienced ‘during the year of 
takeover’ in thirteen of the twenty-six cases could be attributed to either the previous 
or current owners, or a combination of the two, the logistical process itself or even the 
timing of transfer.       
 
The most significant period is the years ‘post takeover’, in which operations and 
productivity were the responsibility of the new owners. During these years, failures to 
produce comparable levels of output were attributable to the new proprietors. They 
were expected to have overcome any introductory problems by this stage (6-8 months 
later) and be fully focused on the running of their farms. Although these assumptions 
are theoretically feasible, productivity declined ‘post transfer’ in eleven of the twenty-
three cases for which data were available by an average of 35.48%, over an average 
period of two to three years per farm.  
 
Of the twenty-three available land redistribution cases under study, one was classified 
as PLAS (Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy) and the remainder LRAD (Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development). As previously explained, in PLAS 
deals the land remains the property of the state (state property regime) and is leased to 
 
 
the individuals running the farms, whilst in LRAD transactions, private property 
rights are assigned to the new owners. The authoritative literature suggests that the 
owners who obtained private property rights to the land (via LRAD) should have 
achieved more efficient outputs (compared with alternative property rights regimes). 
These owners are more likely to be driven by a profit motive because of the direct link 
between efficient work and ownership.  
    
With the motivation to achieve high outputs established for the twenty-two private 
property rights empowered LRAD cases, the most logical explanation for a lack of 
such performance on ten of these LRAD farms ‘post takeover’ is lack of capability on 
the part of the new owners. With no formal mentorship or assistance from the 
government, new owners had only their own knowledge and experience in sugarcane 
farming on which to rely. At least ten of the new owners were evidently deficient in 
this area, and their lack of understanding resulted in significant reductions in the 
productivity of their farms. Assistance from the government may well have helped 
these farmers to reach greater output levels, but none was forthcoming.  
 
5.7 The fundamental problems  
 
Two fundamental problems can be identified within KwaZulu-Natal’s redistribution 
programme. Firstly, the transfer of land at redistribution prices higher than ordinary 
market prices and secondly, the apparent inability of government to realise the 
productivity shortcomings in fifty percent of the transactions studied, and a seeming 
unwillingness or inability to intervene effectively.   
 
When focusing on the first problem three important observations were made:  
1) To begin with, as a consequence of the current land redistribution market structure 
(monopsonistic redistribution market within a competitive ordinary farmland market) 
farmers have the overwhelming bargaining power. The result is that this market 
structure needs to be amended by creating additional competition for farmland in the 
redistribution market, and preventing the government from having to continually 
‘give in’, and meet farmers’ ever-increasing asking prices.  
 
 
 
2) In most cases, the major determinant of each farm’s final selling price was the 
value placed on it by an independent appraiser. In the preceding chapter, it was 
described how at least ten different valuers were identified between the two districts. 
In many cases, they assigned different prices per hectare to the same classes of 
property. This is evident in the findings in cases U7 and U9 (Table 4.5), which both 
had a ‘year of sale for valuation purposes’ of 2006, were of a similar size (145 ha and 
170 ha’s respectively) and produced similar yields of 68 and 63 tons per hectare. 
However, U7’s valuation price was at R35 000 per hectare of sugarcane, 18.76% 
higher than U9’s, which was R29 470. Had these farms been assessed by a common 
valuer, U7’s owner may have received R801 850 less, or conversely U9’s owner may 
have received R940 100 more. Undoubtedly, such a large difference in price per 
hectare should have been recognised and questioned by the public authorities 
overseeing the deals. Therefore, it seems the authorities are not fulfilling their 
responsibilities.  
 
3) The reason why such discrepancies have not been identified can be traced to the 
administrative difficulties apparent within the Department of Land Affairs. As 
mentioned in chapter four, when deciding whether or not to approve the land 
redistribution deals, documentation which includes the independent valuation reports, 
is submitted to the Department of Land Affairs. That department, however, does not 
have a division dedicated to agricultural farmland pricing, the purpose of which 
would be to verify the accuracy of submitted valuations. Hence the land redistribution 
prices paid by government are unlikely to be equitable failing a basis of valuations 
prepared using the same criteria. Moreover, such valuations are not properly checked 
and verified at the crucial final stage of the process.    
 
The situation may lend itself to abuse by both valuers and farmers. It is possible that 
collusion between the two parties could lead the ‘independent’ valuer to deliberately 
over-value the land for a percentage of the farmer’s additional profit post settlement. 
No publicised media reports of such behaviour were found.   
 
The second question focuses on why government is not acting to correct the poor 
results of land redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal. Sugarcane production has been 
negatively affected in fifty percent of the redistribution cases studied, with losses of 
 
 
recoverable income reaching R78 million for the 1443 hectares under review. The 
Uthungulu district’s productivity has been particularly badly affected, with output 
dropping by an average of 39.51% for six of its seven cases, resulting in their 
collective average annual income declining by approximately 44%. The Uthungulu 
district is therefore in need of assistance from an external source e.g. provincial 
government or its appointed agents. It should be of grave concern that land 
redistribution prices have continued to rise in the Uthungulu district, while 
performance remains unsatisfactory. It is obvious that the higher prices are not being 
paid for enhanced productivity. In fact, there are no purely economic reasons 
outlaying high premiums.  
 
The mentorship programme, which was intended specifically for LRAD transactions, 
would be a step in the right direction, but surely within a year of the concepts 
approval agricultural advisors should have been assigned farms to oversee. A lack of 
evidence cannot be cited as an excuse, as information on the productive performance 
of land redistribution in the Uthungulu and iLembe districts is readily available to the 
authorities concerned from national records and the South African Sugarcane Growers 
Association.  
 
5.8 Summary 
 
The chapter began by discussing the prices data, and the extent of over or under-
payment in the districts concerned. Of the twenty farms sold by private individuals 
and small companies, thirteen were found not to have taken place at market related 
prices, and a total payment over the ordinary market rates of approximately R10.7 
million was recorded. Although the prices were found to be very high in comparison 
to the market rate (up to 50% higher), such prices are to be expected given 
government’s limited bargaining power and their redistribution time constraints. The 
government’s annual land redistribution costs were then researched revealing a major 
increase in expenditure from 2004-2006 and an effort to accelerate the number of 
transactions taking place. This concerted effort to hasten the redistribution process 
was in response to continuous pressure from the media for South Africa’s land 
redistribution policy to meet its targets punctually. The section that followed proposed 
explanations as to why higher prices were paid for sugarcane farmland in the majority 
 
 
of land redistribution deals concluded in the districts of Uthungulu and iLembe (sold 
by private individuals and small companies). In this regard, administrative incapacity, 
combined with the slow rate of land redistribution and poor market structure 
(resulting in a lack of competition) were identified as the main contributors. The 
examination of prices ended with a brief look at the causality between land 
redistribution prices and those of the market, concluding that any causality is likely to 
be two way, but could not be confirmed due to the incomplete data. The lack of full 
time series data (not enough observations) further prevented correlation analysis from 
being conducted.  
 
Focus then shifted to productivity, and the degree of underperformance on the farms 
sold through land redistribution in the Uthungulu and iLembe districts. ‘During the 
year of takeover’, results were disappointing, as productivity declined in thirteen of 
the twenty-six farms. ‘Post takeover’, eleven of the twenty-three available cases 
recorded a decline in their output of sugarcane per hectare, resulting in the loss of a 
large sum of potential income. Minor mentorship and a better relationship between 
past and current owners allowed the farms involving the large corporation to generate 
the best productivity results. By noting the highest historical ‘observed levels of 
output’ per farm, it was further evident that post transfer only four farms were 
producing within five tons per hectare below these levels, illustrating room for 
substantial improvement. A discussion as to why the productivity of those farms may 
be dwindling followed, highlighting a lack of experience on the part of the new 
owners, an inability of government to assist with after sales mentorship and other 
weaknesses within the transfer process as the main contributing factors.  
 
The fundamental problems of South Africa’s land redistribution were identified as:  
 
1) The above market prices paid for farmland, which were attributed to:  
a) The lack of competition for farmland in the redistribution market affording 
sellers an overwhelming amount of bargaining power, and 
b) The incapacity of the Department of Land Affairs to verify the valuations 
submitted to them before approving redistribution purchases.  
 
 
 
2) The inability of government to recognise the productivity shortcomings of the new 
owners, and ameliorate the situation through the introduction of a mentorship 
programme. 
 
5.9 Recommendations 
 
To address some of the problems identified in KwaZulu-Natal’s redistribution 
programme, the following recommendations are suggested:  
 
1) It may be an option to establish independent institutions with a limited annual 
budget to fast track the redistribution programme. The institutions would have 
to compete with each other in terms of their performance to achieve the 
government’s goals. Moreover, instead of having only one buyer in the 
redistribution market, more buyers would exist. This would hopefully 
eliminate many of the unequal bargaining powers which were identified in the 
thesis as inherent to the land redistribution market.   
 
Nonetheless, the establishment of additional public institutions would come at 
high transactional costs, including time consuming legal processes and 
administrative costs. Even if an improved and more efficient redistribution 
market was created in the long run, a Cost-Benefit analysis of this proposal 
would have to be conducted beforehand as a cautionary measure.     
 
2) In the event that future research determined that the potential benefits would 
far outweigh the costs in setting up the proposed valuation institutions, a 
division in the DLA would also have to be set up to oversee the valuation 
activities.  
 
The combined investment costs of establishing new valuation institutions and 
a verification division within the department would have to be lower than the 
R10.7 million which was estimated in the research for the period 2002 to 
2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) The LRAD mentorship programme should be put into action with immediate 
effect, monitoring all land redistribution transactions and ensuring production 
levels are maintained and farm management is sound.  
 
By initiating the above recommendations KwaZulu-Natal’s land redistribution 
programme will be substantially uplifted, and its credibility improved among the 
South African government, public and media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
            
 
CONCLUSION  
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
The thesis set out to investigate whether the South African government has been 
paying above or below market prices for sugarcane farmland in the districts of 
Uthungulu and iLembe. It was found that on average, land redistribution prices were 
16.34% above those of the market rates, for sales negotiated by independent private 
individuals and small companies. In addition the thesis set out to investigate the 
changes in the productivity on these farms ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘post transfer’. It 
was found that on average farms were not producing close to optimum levels, and that 
productivity decreased ‘during’ and ‘post’ transfer.   
 
Two case studies were presented. Twenty-seven farms were included in the research, 
and it was discovered that the prices the government has paid to farmers for their 
sugarcane farmland were, in the majority of cases, above the non-redistributive 
market rates, and reached excessive premiums of 40%-50% in the more recent cases. 
Above market price payment on thirteen of the twenty farms studied, which were sold 
by private individuals and small companies, amounted to R10.7 million. These 
thirteen farms collectively spanned 1898 hectares. Considering that the Republic’s 
government aims to redistribute around 30 million hectares of commercial farmland, 
if the payment of above market prices occurring in the Uthungulu and iLembe 
districts were to extend throughout the rest of the country, the total of such payments 
could run into the hundreds of billions of rand. One of the explanations proposed for 
the high premiums in redistribution transactions was that the government has limited 
bargaining power due to a lack of competition to purchase land for redistribution and 
onerous time pressures to meet political targets.  
 
Excessive payments were also attributed to the following factors: 
 
 
 
a) The incapacity of the Department of Land Affairs to verify farm valuations   
submitted to them before approving redistribution purchases,  
 
b) The large number of independent valuers conducting farm assessments for the 
Department of Land Affairs, 
 
c) The use of dissimilar valuations parameters by different independent valuers. 
 
Productivity results showed that: 
 
a) ‘During the year of takeover’ data were available for twenty-six farms (out of 
a total twenty-seven), thirteen of which registered reductions in output per 
hectare averaging 29.20%. These results depict a poor transition between new 
and old proprietors in terms of productivity, 
  
b) ‘Post takeover’, where output was fully accounted for by the newly 
empowered owners and lessees, data on twenty-three of the cases existed. 
Eleven of these farms did not maintain or improve previous output levels, 
with production dropping by an average of 35.48%, over an average of two to 
three years. Collectively under-performance on the eleven farms meant the 
loss of about 48 000 tons of sugarcane, with a forgone monetary value of 
approximately R78 million. These farms accounted for 1443 hectares of 
farmland, less than 0.005% of the total amount of commercial farmland to be 
redistributed by 2014. If losses of income recorded in the Uthungulu and 
iLembe districts were to be experienced throughout the country, huge losses 
would accrue to South Africa’s agricultural sector.   
 
It was pointed out that the encouraging productivity levels (‘during’ and ‘post’ 
transfer), which were recorded on the farms sold by a large corporation were due to 
the following major factors: 
 
a) The superior relationship between past and new owners,  
 
 
 
b) The minor mentorship provided by the large corporation.  
 
It was proposed that these factors may provide a framework through which land 
redistribution can be handled, given the evidence of benefits experienced.  
 
The levels of under-production on the remaining farms were attributed to the 
following factors:  
 
a) The lack of formal after sales mentorship from the government,  
 
b) Incapacity on the part of the new owners and lessees, 
 
c) The timing of the transfer of farmland from old to new proprietor. 
 
In light of the productivity challenges and high prices which are being experienced in 
KwaZulu-Natal’s land redistribution programme, the following recommendations 
were proposed: 
 
a) The government should establish a number of independent land redistribution 
entities, all of which compete to redistribute farmland cost effectively,  
 
b) The current system of using numerous independent valuers to assess farms 
prior to redistributive purchase should be restructured, reducing the number of 
these valuers to one accountable institution if possible,  
 
c) The Department of Land Affairs should establish an independent division the 
responsibility of which would be to verify the accuracy of submitted farm 
valuations, 
 
d) The LRAD mentorship programme must be implemented properly, assigning 
all agricultural advisors farms to oversee. 
 
In order for the recommendations to succeed, a greater degree of co-operation 
between farmers and government is necessary.  It will take time, and the combined 
 
 
efforts of national, provincial and local government, as well as institutions such as the 
South African Cane Growers Association and Inkezo Land Company. If the 
redistribution policies are not re-evaluated, it is likely that a number of the farms 
studied will cease operations. The result would be a loss of jobs, output revenue and 
formerly productive land lying dormant.  
 
Further research should investigate the impact of additional factors on sugarcane 
farmland prices such as: regional location, proximity to local mills, topography and 
the value of fixed capital improvements.   
 
Additional research should further identify the shortcomings of existing mentoring 
programmes and how industry led services provided by institutions like Inkezo Land 
Company and the South African Cane Growers Association could complement 
government’s LRAD programme.   
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APPENDIX 
 
A-1. Uthungulu- land redistribution transactions of private individuals and small companies 
UTHUNGULU DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL COMPANIES 
FARM/ 
CASE AUC (HA'S) 
VALUATION 
PER HA OF 
SUGARCANE 
(R) 
PRICE PAID 
PER HA OF 
SUGARCANE 
(R) 
PREMIUM 
(+) OR 
DISCOUNT 
(-) ON 
PRICE PAID 
(%) 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES 
AVERAGE 
TONS 
PRODUCED 
PER HA 
(4YR) 
LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
PRICE PAID PER 
HA OF YIELD (R) 
MARKET 
PRICE PER 
HECTARE 
OF YIELD (R)
PREMIUM (+) 
OR 
DISCOUNT (-) 
ON MARKET 
PRICE (%) 
U 1 108 18 000 9 275 48.47 - 2003 47 198 333 40.54  -
U 2 105 10 244 5 611 45.22 - 2004 30 185 359 48.47  -
U 3 123 11 000 9 816 10.76 - 2004 33 295 359 17.83  -
U 4 98 18 870 9 561 49.33 - 2004 33 289 359 19.50  -
U 5 220 18 182 15 909 12.50 - 2004 29 548 359 52.65 +
U 6 59 20 000 19 048 4.76 - 2006 35 548 378 44.97 +
U 7 145 35 000 35 000 0.00 2006 68 519 378 37.30 +
U 8 52 38 000 38 000 0.00 2006 62 616 378 62.96 +
U 9 170 29 471 29 471 0.00 2006 63 464 378 22.75 +
U 10 127 16 731 16 731 0.00 2006 33 505 378 33.60 +
TOTAL 1207 215 497 188 422 173.98 -  - 433 4167 3659 127.89 +
AVERAGE 121 21 550 18 842 17.40 -  - 43 417 366 12.79 +
  
AUC = Area under cane, measured in hectares 
Note: Both the 'Market price per hectare of yield' and the 'Land redistribution price paid per hectare of yield' are based on an average 4yr production history 
        Where an average 4yr production history is used, this includes the yield from the 'year of sale for valuation purposes', and the 3 previous years 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a) 
 
 
A-2. iLembe- land redistribution transactions of private individuals and small companies 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL COMPANIES 
FARM/ 
CASE AUC (HA'S) 
VALUATION 
PER HA OF 
SUGARCANE 
(R) 
PRICE PAID 
PER HA OF 
SUGARCANE 
(R) 
PREMIUM 
(+) OR 
DISCOUNT 
(-) ON 
PRICE PAID 
(%) 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES   
AVERAGE 
TONS 
PRODUCED 
PER HA 
(4YR) 
LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
PRICE PAID PER 
HA OF YIELD (R) 
MARKET 
PRICE PER 
HECTARE 
OF YIELD (R)
PREMIUM (+) 
OR 
DISCOUNT (-) 
ON MARKET 
PRICE (%) 
I 1 200 11 500 9 703 15.62 - 2002 39 250 325 23.07  -
I 2 150 19 177 18 510 3.48 - 2004 39 474 377 25.73 +
I 3 79 21 000 16 525 21.31 - 2004 36 465 377 23.34 +
I 4 1108 20 000 11 942 40.29 - 2004 51 234 377 37.93  -
I 5 93 6 022 6 022 0.00 2004 13 453 377 20.32 +
I 6 55 17 500 15 962 8.79 - 2004 47 342 377 9.23  -
I 7 95 9 000 8 789 2.34 - 2005 22 405 287 41.11 +
I 8 211 19 905 19 905 0.00 2005 42 472 287 64.46 +
I 9 45 17 333 11 956 31.03 - 2005 29 418 287 45.64 +
I 10 452 20 000 16 703 16.48 - 2005 39 427 287 48.78 +
TOTAL 2488 161 437 136 017 139.34 -  - 356 3940 3355 199.15 +
AVERAGE 249 16 144 13 602 13.93 -  - 36 394 335 19.92 +
  
AUC = Area under cane, measured in hectares
Note: Both the 'Market price per hectare of yield' and the 'Land redistribution price paid per hectare of yield' are based on an average 4yr production history 
        Where an average 4yr production history is used, this includes the yield from the 'year of sale for valuation purposes', and the 3 previous years 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a) 
 
 
 
 
A-3. iLembe- land redistribution transactions of a large corporation 
ILEMBE DISTRICT 
LAND REDISTRIBUTION - LARGE CORPORATE DEALS 
FARM/ 
CASE AUC (HA'S) 
VALUATION 
PER HA OF 
SUGARCANE 
(R) 
PRICE PAID 
PER HA OF 
SUGARCANE 
(R) 
PREMIUM 
(+) OR 
DISCOUNT 
(-) ON 
PRICE PAID 
(%) 
YEAR OF 
SALE FOR 
VALUATION 
PURPOSES 
AVERAGE 
TONS 
PRODUCED 
PER HA 
(4YR) 
LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
PRICE PAID PER 
HA OF YIELD (R) 
MARKET 
PRICE PER 
HECTARE 
OF YIELD (R)
PREMIUM (+) 
OR 
DISCOUNT (-) 
ON MARKET 
PRICE (%) 
I 11a 88 15 518 15 530 0.08 + 2004 47 333 377 11.67  -
I 11b 95 15 647 16 155 3.14 + 2004 46 352 377 6.63  -
I 11c 105 18 154 18 147 0.04  - 2004 48 381 377 1.06 +
I 11d 128 14 523 14 524 0.01 + 2004 46 316 377 16.18  -
I 11e 82 20 000 19 005 4.98  - 2004 47 401 377 6.37 +
I 12 93 16 417 16 417 0.00  2004 48 343 377 9.02  -
I 13 123 13 000 13 000 0.00 2004 32 411 377 9.02 +
TOTAL 714 113 258 112 777 1.79 -  - 313 2536 2636 27.05 -
AVERAGE 101 16 180 16 111 0.26 -  - 45 362 377 3.86 -
  
AUC = Area under cane, measured in hectares 
Note: Both the 'Market price per hectare of yield' and the 'Land redistribution price paid per hectare of yield' are based on an average 4yr production history 
        Where an average 4yr production history is used, this includes the yield from the 'year of sale for valuation purposes', and the 3 previous years 
        Cases I 11a-e represent one farm, which was split into five sections for sales purposes 
Source: Adapted from Cane Growers (2008a; 2008c); DLA (2008a)  
 
 
 
A-4. Historical recoverable value prices of sugarcane per ton 
SEASON  PRICE (R) 
2007/2008 1701.90 
2006/2007 1701.86 
2005/2006 1389.80 
2004/2005 1297.19 
2003/2004 1357.01 
2002/2003 1368.79 
2001/2002 1352.14 
Source: Cane Growers (2008b) 
 
 
 
